811 S.E.2d 807
S.C. Ct. App.2017Background
- Edward James Mims, a severely developmentally disabled man, lived in state-contracted residential facilities (Clusters, then Kensington) and suffered multiple injuries and signs of neglect between 1999–2005 (beating, insect bites, unexplained penile laceration, weight loss, vomiting, etc.).
- CMS and the State Long Term Care Ombudsman found systemic deficiencies at the facilities (staffing, supervision, training); Kensington’s certification was terminated in April 2005.
- Mims’ mother sought and obtained guardianship after the 2005 unexplained penile injury; Mims’ amended complaint adding DDSN employees Lacy and Butkus was filed May 7, 2008 and served May 12, 2008.
- The circuit court granted summary judgment to respondents, limiting Mims’ claims to three discrete incidents, finding many claims time-barred, and dismissing § 1983, negligence, and supervisory-liability claims.
- On appeal the court held (1) the action commenced on filing (May 7, 2008); (2) Mims is entitled to tolling under S.C. Code § 15-3-40 because he meets the Wiggins definition of ‘‘insane’’ for tolling; (3) guardianship did not terminate the disability for tolling; (4) summary judgment was improper as to § 1983 (supervisory liability) and state tort claims, but proper as to ADA/Rehabilitation Act claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the suit commenced on filing or service | Mims: action commenced when amended complaint was filed (May 7, 2008) | Respondents: suit commenced on service (May 12, 2008); statute limitations run from service | Held: lawsuit commenced on filing per Rule 3(a) and §15-3-20(B); May 7, 2008 controls |
| Whether Mims is entitled to tolling under §15-3-40 (disability/insanity) | Mims: lifelong severe disability meets Wiggins test; tolling applies; guardianship did not end disability | Respondents: Mims not ‘‘insane’’ when claims accrued; alternatively guardianship ended disability; §44-26-90 limits tolling to court-declared incompetents | Held: Mims meets Wiggins; tolling applies; guardianship does not end disability; §44-26-90 not read to defeat §15-3-40 protections |
| Scope and sufficiency of §1983 supervisory-liability claim against Lacy and Butkus | Mims: alleges systemic knowledge of pervasive risk and deliberate indifference causing unlawful confinement and injuries | Respondents: claims limited to three discrete incidents; insufficient evidence of widespread abuse or supervisory knowledge; failure to state a claim | Held: trial court erred—claims are not limited to three incidents; Mims presented more than a scintilla of evidence raising material factual disputes on supervisory liability and causation; reversed on §1983 claims |
| ADA and Rehabilitation Act claim that DDSN denied least-restrictive services | Mims: DDSN systematically favored institutional placement over in-home services (pay structure, denials) | Respondents: insufficient evidence of systematic policy or widespread practice; single denials are inadequate | Held: summary judgment proper for ADA/Rehab Act claims—plaintiff failed to present more than a scintilla showing systemic violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Wiggins v. Edwards, 314 S.C. 126, 442 S.E.2d 169 (defining "insane" for tolling purposes)
- Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (adopting personal-injury limitations period for §1983 actions)
- Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791 (4th Cir.) (elements of §1983 supervisory liability)
- Hancock v. Mid-S. Mgmt. Co., Inc., 381 S.C. 326, 673 S.E.2d 801 (summary judgment standards for nonmoving party under federal law)
- Harrison v. Bevilacqua, 354 S.C. 129, 580 S.E.2d 109 (statute-of-limitations tolling language permits extension up to five years)
- Madison ex rel. Bryant v. Babcock Ctr., Inc., 371 S.C. 123, 638 S.E.2d 650 (proximate cause and review of pre-limitations evidence)
- Flateau v. Harrelson, 355 S.C. 197, 584 S.E.2d 413 (Tort Claims Act two-year limitations and government-entity immunity)
- Hotel & Motel Holdings, LLC v. BJC Enters., LLC, 414 S.C. 635, 780 S.E.2d 263 (pleading sufficiency standard at dismissal)