Estate of Michael Lewis v. Concord General Mutual Insurance Company
87 A.3d 732
Me.2014Background
- Michael Lewis, 16, agreed to buy a 1990 Ford F-150 for $900 from William Dodge; Dodge gave a signed bill of sale, keys, maintenance history, and the title but did not sign the back or complete odometer disclosure.
- Michael possessed the truck for 11 days after purchase but had not registered or insured it; the truck appeared registered in Dodge’s name and Dodge’s insurance card remained in the truck.
- Parsons testified that Dodge allowed Michael to use the truck with Dodge’s registration and insurance until Michael obtained his own, while Dodge later removed the truck from his policy.
- Dodge did not transfer title or sign a formal title transfer; the truck’s registration certificate was not returned to the state, and the transfer’s finality depended on the parties’ understanding of when ownership passed.
- Concord, Allstate, and Hartford denied uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage to Michael’s Estate, contending the vehicle was not owned by Michael at the time of the accident, and the Estate sued for breach of those policies.
- The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurers, concluding ownership passed to Michael as a matter of law; the Estate appealed, challenging the ownership timing and the applicability of the infancy doctrine.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was there a genuine dispute about when ownership passed to Michael? | Estate contends the sale was not final until Michael insured/registered. | Defendants argue ownership passed on August 8, 2009 per Dodge’s affidavit. | Yes; there are material factual disputes about finality of sale. |
| Did the infancy doctrine render the contract void or voidable? | Infancy prevented binding ownership transfer due to Michael’s minority. | Contract could be valid and enforceable; infancy does not automatically negate ownership. | Minority does not automatically void the contract; issues remain fact-dependent. |
| Should the other-owned-vehicle exclusions be enforced to bar coverage? | Exclusions should be unenforceable because ownership was unresolved. | Exclusions apply if Michael owned an uninsurable vehicle. | Part of the ownership question; not resolved on summary judgment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Smile, Inc. v. Moosehead Sanitary Dist., 649 A.2d 1103 (Me. 1994) (contract terms; parol evidence; intent questions for fact-finder)
- Fitzgerald v. Hutchins, 2009 ME 115 (Me. 2009) (terms of oral agreements; intent and meaning for fact-finder)
- VanVoorhees v. Dodge, 679 A.2d 1077 (Me. 1996) (parol contract; implied agreement; contract formation)
- Lougee Conservancy v. Citi-Mortgage, Inc., 2012 ME 103 (Me. 2012) (summary judgment; conflicting inferences; fact-finder role)
- Dyer v. Dep’t of Transp., 2008 ME 106 (Me. 2008) (summary judgment standard; material facts; de novo review)
- Estate of Smith v. Cumberland Cnty., 2013 ME 13 (Me. 2013) (summary judgment; material facts; light most favorable to nonmoving party)
- 11 M.R.S. § 2-401(2), 11 M.R.S. § 2-401(2) ((statute)) (sale passes title on delivery; unless otherwise agreed)
- Ford v. Howgate, 106 Me. 517, 523, 76 A. 939 (1910) (Me. 1910) (sale complete upon delivery and possession)