Estate of: McFadden, G. Appeal of: Harrison, R., 100 A.3d 645

Decedent George McFadden executed a residuary trust in his 1930 will providing income to children (2:1 male:female) and, upon a perpetuities trigger, distribution of principal per stirpes in the same proportions.
The perpetuities clause provided termination “upon the expiration of the period of twenty‑one years after the death of the last survivor of the children and issue of deceased children of mine living at my death.”
All four of Decedent’s children were alive at his death; two grandchildren were also alive. The parties disputed which class-member (child or grandchild) constituted the measuring life.
The orphans’ court held the measuring life was the last surviving child (Emily Staempfli), so the trust terminated Feb. 21, 2012 (21 years after her death). Appellants appealed.
The en banc Superior Court reversed, holding the clause ambiguous and, construing extrinsic indicia and the testamentary scheme, that Decedent intended the measuring life to be the survivor of grandchildren alive at his death, thereby extending the trust to the maximum lawful duration.

Issue	Appellants' Argument	Appellees/Orphans' Ct. Argument	Held
What is the measuring life that triggers the 21‑year perpetuities period: last surviving child or survivor of grandchildren alive at Decedent’s death?	McFadden intended the trust to last the maximum time permitted (use surviving grandchild among grandchildren alive at his death as measuring life); the 1930 Will’s changes from the 1928 Will show intent to extend duration.	The perpetuities language unambiguously ties the trigger to the last surviving child (or issue of a deceased child), and because all children were alive at Decedent’s death, grandchildren do not qualify as measuring lives.	Reversed the orphans’ court: the clause is ambiguous; court construes the will and extrinsic evidence to conclude Decedent intended the surviving grandchild among those alive at his death to be the measuring life (trust endures to the maximum lawful period).

In re Newlin’s Estate, 80 A.2d 819 (Pa. 1951) (definition and nature of perpetuities)
In re Lockhart’s Estate, 159 A. 874 (Pa. 1932) (rule against perpetuities—vesting within lives in being plus 21 years)
In re Estate of Weaver, 572 A.2d 1249 (Pa. Super. 1990) (historical stages of rule against perpetuities; vertical separability doctrine)
Estate of Moltrup, 225 A.2d 676 (Pa. 1967) (testator intent is polestar in will interpretation)
In re Estate of Rider, 711 A.2d 1018 (Pa. Super. 1998) (rules for will interpretation; avoid rendering provisions nugatory)
In re Schultheis, 747 A.2d 918 (Pa. Super. 2000) (limits on extrinsic evidence for ambiguous will language)
In re McFadden’s Estate, 112 A.2d 148 (Pa. 1955) (prior litigation involving the same testator; comment on intent and construction)
In re Trust Estate of Pleet, 410 A.2d 1224 (Pa. 1980) (construction favors interpretation carrying out natural intention when alternative leads to highly improbable result)