Estate of Lockett ex rel. Lockett v. Fallin
841 F.3d 1098
| 10th Cir. | 2016Background
- Clayton Lockett was convicted and sentenced to death; Oklahoma scheduled his execution using a new three-drug lethal‑injection protocol (midazolam, vecuronium bromide, potassium chloride) that had not previously been used by the State.
- The protocol was revised multiple times shortly before the execution; it did not require a backup IV, visible/uncovered IV site, continuous observation of the IV site, backup drug dosages, or specific training for personnel.
- During the execution the IV placed in Lockett’s groin infiltrated; some drug leaked into surrounding tissue. Lockett exhibited convulsions and signs of distress; death was pronounced 43 minutes after the first drug was administered.
- The Estate sued state officials and medical personnel asserting Eighth Amendment (torture, deliberate indifference, experimentation, failure to train), Fourteenth Amendment (procedural due process), and Sixth/First Amendment claims; defendants moved to dismiss asserting qualified immunity.
- The district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified‑immunity grounds; the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding plaintiffs failed to show violation of clearly established law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Qualified immunity for execution‑participants (including private doctor) | Defendants acted unlawfully during execution and thus are not immune | Qualified immunity protects officials (and, under Filarsky logic, a private doctor performing government execution duties) unless they violated clearly established law | Affirmed: qualified immunity applies; plaintiffs did not plead violation of clearly established rights |
| Eighth Amendment — torture / deliberate indifference (prolonged/ painful execution) | Lockett was tortured and defendants were deliberately indifferent to risk of severe pain caused by IV infiltration and protocol choices | Suffering resulted from an isolated mishap (IV infiltration); Baze/Glossip permit some risk of pain and do not convert such mishaps into constitutional violations | Dismissed: allegations describe an "isolated mishap" under Baze; no clearly established Eighth Amendment violation |
| Challenge to new drug (midazolam) and dosage / experimentation | Use of midazolam (and compounded drugs earlier alleged) created substantial risk of severe pain; dosage/novel combination unconstitutional | Glossip and related authority permit alternative protocols where prior drugs are unavailable; no evidence of intent to inflict pain or that use was clearly unlawful | Dismissed: claim based on use of midazolam fails; plaintiffs abandoned compounded‑drug claim; no clearly established law showing illegality |
| Procedural due process / right to counsel / failure to train | Lockett had state‑created liberty interests in certain drugs/procedures and a right to counsel during painful execution; Trammell and Patton failed to promulgate adequate policies and training | Oklahoma law was changed to permit “drug or drugs”; plaintiff had state‑court opportunities to challenge protocol; no precedent clearly establishing procedural or counsel rights throughout execution; training failures not clearly established to violate Eighth Amendment | Dismissed: no clearly established due‑process or counsel right; failure‑to‑train and policy claims fail because they do not show deliberate indifference under clearly established law |
Key Cases Cited
- Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (plurality opinion explaining Eighth Amendment standard for methods of execution and that isolated mishaps do not necessarily establish unconstitutional risk)
- Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (affirming that states facing unavailability of traditional execution drugs may use alternatives and discussing midazolam)
- Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (clarifying that clearly established law must not be defined at a high level of generality)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified‑immunity framework permitting courts to choose the order of the two prongs)
- Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657 (2012) (qualified immunity may extend to private individuals performing government functions in certain circumstances)
- Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) (qualified immunity generally does not apply to private prison employees, but analysis is fact specific)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (failure‑to‑train § 1983 standard: liability only where inadequate training amounts to deliberate indifference)
- Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (framework for identifying state‑created liberty interests for due‑process claims)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (deliberate indifference standard requires subjective awareness of substantial risk)