320 F.R.D. 520
E.D. Cal.2017Background
- Plaintiffs (surviving wife, minor children, and estate) allege Kern County deputies caused Donald Levingston’s death after a February 26, 2015 traffic stop and delayed/insufficient medical care; they assert Fourteenth Amendment and state-law claims, plus Monell and supervisory claims against Sheriff Donny Youngblood.
- Plaintiffs allege a County culture and policies tolerating constitutional violations, racial profiling, inadequate training, and deliberate indifference to serious medical/mental-health needs.
- Sheriff Youngblood is sued in his official and individual capacities for supervisory liability and is alleged to approve overall training/policy regimes.
- Defendants moved for a protective order to bar Youngblood’s deposition, invoking the "apex" doctrine as he is a high-ranking elected official; Plaintiffs oppose.
- The magistrate judge found Youngblood is a high-ranking (apex) official, concluded plaintiffs had not exhausted less intrusive discovery or shown Youngblood’s unique, first‑hand knowledge, and granted the protective order, subject to reconsideration if plaintiffs pursue lower-level discovery and still cannot obtain the needed evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Youngblood is subject to the apex doctrine | Youngblood has personal, relevant knowledge (policies, prior responses, implementation) and is therefore deposable | Youngblood is a high-ranking official and lacks unique, first-hand knowledge of the incident or policy implementation | Youngblood is an apex official; apex doctrine applies |
| Whether plaintiffs must show less intrusive discovery was exhausted before deposing an apex official | Plaintiffs argue exhaustion is not absolute but must show unique knowledge; they did not yet seek lower-level discovery | Defendants argue plaintiffs must first pursue less intrusive means (written discovery, depositions of PMQs) | Court required reasonable efforts to obtain information from other sources before deposing Youngblood |
| Whether Youngblood has unique, first‑hand, non‑repetitive knowledge (e.g., ratification, discipline, training specifics) | Plaintiffs point to Youngblood’s role approving training/regimes and public statements on responses to disabled persons | Defendants submit Youngblood learned of the incident only after a tort claim, had no direct involvement in policy drafting or training delivery, and lacks personal knowledge | Court found plaintiffs failed to show Youngblood has unique first‑hand knowledge and accepted defendants’ showing he lacks such knowledge |
| Whether protective order is appropriate to bar deposition entirely | Plaintiffs argue defendants failed to meet burden to justify a protective order | Defendants argue deposition would be burdensome and unnecessary because information is obtainable elsewhere | Court granted protective order but left door open to lift it if plaintiffs first pursue lower‑level discovery and still cannot obtain evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978) (broad relevance standard for discovery)
- Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1975) (strong showing required to deny a deposition entirely)
- Phillips v. General Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2002) (party seeking protection bears burden to show specific prejudice or harm)
- Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 282 F.R.D. 259 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (apex deposition factors: unique first‑hand knowledge and exhaustion of less intrusive means)
- Kyle Eng. Co. v. Kleppe, 600 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1979) (heads of government agencies not normally subject to deposition absent extraordinary circumstances)
- Salter v. Upjohn, 593 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1979) (party may be required to depose lower‑level employees before apex official)