Estate of Lake Jacobson v. Matthew Hornbeck
353862
| Mich. Ct. App. | Jul 22, 2021Background
- December 30, 2017: Houge slid his car off the road; Pittsfield Twp. officers Hornbeck and Bradley responded; Sakstrup wrecker driver Downs recovered the car and released it to Houge, who drove off.
- About 1,000 feet later Houge drove head-on into Lake Jacobson’s car, killing Houge and fatally injuring Jacobson; postmortem toxicology showed BAC 0.242%.
- Plaintiff (estate) sued the officers and Sakstrup for negligence, alleging officers ignored signs of intoxication and allowed a damaged, intoxicated driver back on the road; Sakstrup was alleged vicariously and directly liable for the wrecker operator’s failure to inspect/report and obtain a tow order.
- Officers moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7),(C)(8),(C)(10) arguing governmental immunity/public-duty doctrine; Sakstrup moved under (C)(8)/(C)(10) and later asserted judicial estoppel.
- Trial court denied the motions, finding factual disputes and questioning application of the public-duty doctrine; appeals were taken and consolidated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of public-duty doctrine / special-relationship (officers) | Officers had a duty to Jacobson; special-relationship or affirmative misfeasance existed because officers interacted with and permitted an intoxicated driver to leave. | Duty was to the public generally; no special relationship pleaded; public-duty doctrine bars individual tort claims. | Public-duty doctrine applies; plaintiff did not plead a special relationship to the decedent; officers entitled to dismissal under MCR 2.116(C)(8). |
| Governmental immunity / proximate cause under GTLA (officers) | Officers’ gross negligence in returning an intoxicated, damaged car was the proximate cause of Jacobson’s death. | Even if grossly negligent, Houge’s voluntary act of driving off was the "one most immediate, efficient, and direct" cause; GTLA immunity applies. | Even assuming gross negligence, officers’ conduct was not the proximate cause under GTLA; summary disposition required under MCR 2.116(C)(7). |
| Duty of tow company to noncontracting third-party (Sakstrup) | Downs failed to determine/report unroadworthy condition or request a tow order; Sakstrup owed a tort duty and is vicariously liable. | No special relationship or duty to third-party; contract was with Houge only; no legal duty to Jacobson absent creation of a new hazard. | Trial court used wrong analysis; remanded to determine whether Sakstrup owed an independent duty to the decedent (Loweke/new-hazard framework). |
| Judicial estoppel (Sakstrup) | Plaintiff’s earlier position that officers were the proximate cause estops plaintiff from blaming Sakstrup. | Earlier litigation positions did not establish that a court accepted that officers were the sole proximate cause. | Judicial estoppel does not apply; trial court correctly denied the estoppel motion and that denial is affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- White v Beasley, 453 Mich 308 (adopts Cuffy test and describes public-duty doctrine and special-relationship exception)
- Beaudrie v Henderson, 465 Mich 124 (reaffirms continued application of public-duty doctrine for police officers)
- Cuffy v City of New York, 69 NY2d 255 (formulates four-part special-relationship test applied in White)
- Loweke v Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co, LLC, 489 Mich 157 (contracting party may owe independent tort duty to noncontracting third parties; new-hazard test)
- Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439 (defines "the proximate cause" under GTLA as the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause)
- Ray v Swager, 501 Mich 52 (applies Robinson standard to GTLA proximate-cause analysis)
- Simonds v Tibbitts, 165 Mich App 480 (applying public-duty doctrine to officer’s failure to detain an intoxicated driver)