242 N.C. App. 396
N.C. Ct. App.2015Background
- In 1972 four members of the "Wilmington Ten" (Jacobs, Shepard, Tindall, Wright) were convicted and imprisoned for violent incidents in Wilmington; convictions were reversed by the Fourth Circuit in 1980 for prosecutorial misconduct (Chavis v. State of N.C.).
- In 2012 Governor Beverly Perdue issued pardons of innocence for all Wilmington Ten members; pardons for the four named decedents were posthumous.
- The estates of the four decedents filed petitions (Feb. 25, 2013) under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-82 et seq. seeking statutory compensation for erroneous conviction and imprisonment.
- The State paid the six living members but moved to dismiss the estates’ claims, arguing the statute does not authorize estates to bring claims or claims based on posthumous pardons.
- A Deputy Commissioner denied the motion to dismiss; the Full Commission reversed, holding the statute requires the actual convicted person to be alive and to have received a pardon of innocence during life, and that no claim accrued to survive under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-18-1.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the Full Commission: the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, does not authorize testamentary estates to seek compensation based on posthumous pardons, and claims accrue only upon issuance of a pardon during the claimant’s lifetime.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether testamentary estates may recover under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-82 et seq. based on posthumous pardons | Estates may recover; statute remedial and should be liberally construed to compensate wrongful imprisonment regardless of timing of pardon | Statute plainly authorizes only the convicted individual who was imprisoned and pardoned to petition; estates are not "claimants" under the statute | Held for State: statute’s plain language limits claims to the individual who was convicted, imprisoned, and granted a pardon of innocence (no recovery by estates) |
| Whether claims under § 148-82 accrue before a pardon such that they survive to estates under § 28A-18-1 | A pardon vindicating innocence supports an estate claim; survival statute allows post-death prosecution of rights | Claims under § 148-82 accrue only upon issuance of a pardon of innocence; decedents received pardons posthumously so no claim had accrued to survive | Held for State: no claim accrued during decedents’ lifetimes, so nothing survived to their personal representatives under § 28A-18-1 |
| Proper method of statutory construction (liberal vs. strict) and effect of remedial purpose | Remedial statute should be construed broadly to effectuate compensation goals | Waiver of sovereign immunity requires strict construction; statute language controls | Held: even under liberal construction plaintiffs’ reading conflicts with clear statutory text and would render provisions (e.g., educational awards) nonsensical; plain meaning controls |
Key Cases Cited
- Chavis v. State of N.C., 637 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1980) (reversed Wilmington Ten convictions for prosecutorial misconduct)
- Guthrie v. N.C. State Ports Auth., 307 N.C. 522 (1983) (limits on common-law claims against the State)
- Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 205 (1990) (liberal construction of remedial statutes guidance)
- In re Ernst & Young, LLP, 363 N.C. 612 (2009) (conclusions of law reviewed de novo)
- Gilmore v. Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 222 N.C. 358 (1942) (liberal construction cannot extend beyond statute's clear language)
- Carnahan v. Reed, 53 N.C. App. 589 (1981) (causes of action survive only if accrued prior to death)