Estate of Gregory Sullwold v. The Salvation Army
108 A.3d 1265
| Me. | 2015Background
- Gregory Sullwold, a Salvation Army portfolio specialist, died of a heart attack at home on Feb. 23, 2010 while working remotely; he had been exercising on a treadmill and had his employer‑issued BlackBerry with him.
- He had a prior heart attack (1993) and chronic coronary disease; doctors recommended exercise and he experienced recent chest pain and a panic attack he attributed to work overload.
- His widow filed a workers’ compensation death claim alleging the myocardial infarction was caused by work stress; the Board granted compensation based on findings that work stress was a major causal factor.
- The Salvation Army appealed, arguing the statutory presumption in 39‑A M.R.S. § 327 did not properly apply and that the burden to rebut it was misallocated; the Appellate Division affirmed and the Law Court granted review.
- The Law Court accepted the hearing officer’s factual findings and reviewed legal issues de novo, ultimately affirming the Board’s award.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §327 presumption applied | Evidence (including what decedent would have testified) created a rational potential for compensation so presumption applies | Presumption should not apply because link between work and death was insufficient | Presumption properly applied; evidence showed a rational potential the death arose out of/in course of employment |
| Whether death occurred in the course of employment | Death occurred during work hours, in employer‑sanctioned workplace (home office) while using employer device | Exercise on treadmill was non‑work activity, so not in course of employment | Held death occurred in course of employment given time, place, circumstances, employer authorization and use of employer device |
| Whether death arose out of employment (causation) | Chronic work stress significantly accelerated preexisting heart disease and contributed in a significant manner | Other non‑work factors could have caused death; employer evidence rebutted causation | Held record, including medical testimony and testimony about relentless work stress, could rationally show employment significantly contributed to death |
| Proper burden/standard to rebut §327 presumption | Toomey/Hinds standard: employer must show it is as probable as not that presumed fact does not exist | Employer argued Hall (placing ultimate burden on employer) should govern; also challenged any shift of persuasion | Court found hearing officer applied Toomey ("as probable as not") and did not improperly shift burden; outcome would not change under either standard, so judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Toomey v. City of Portland, 391 A.2d 325 (Me. 1978) (presumption requires preliminary linkage; rebuttal standard explained)
- Hall v. State, 441 A.2d 1019 (Me. 1982) (employer bears ultimate burden on whether injury arose out of/in course of employment)
- Hinds v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 A.2d 721 (Me. 1959) (presumption rebutted when evidence makes nonexistence of presumed fact as probable as not)
- Feiereisen v. NewPage Corp., 5 A.3d 669 (Me. 2010) (definition of "in the course of employment": time, place, circumstances)
- Celentano v. Dep’t of Corr., 887 A.2d 512 (Me. 2005) (preexisting condition compensable only if employment contributed in a significant manner)