983 N.W.2d 572
S.D.2022Background
- Paul Eichstadt (wealthy farmer) and Kathryn began relationship; Kathryn moved in and later agreed to marry Paul in 2002–2003.
- On July 17, 2003 Paul drove Kathryn to his attorney’s office; attorney represented Paul, gave Kathryn a notice that he did not represent her, and Kathryn signed a prenuptial agreement after skimming it (meeting ~10–15 minutes).
- The Agreement waived spousal rights (elective share, homestead, dower/curtesy, etc.); Paul offered to pay for counsel but Kathryn declined, trusting Paul.
- Paul and Kathryn married July 24, 2003; they separated in 2016, Paul changed his will, and died September 2016; Kathryn sought elective share and other statutory spouse allowances.
- Circuit court held Kathryn did not voluntarily sign and that the Agreement was unconscionable; estate appealed. Supreme Court affirmed the involuntariness ruling but reversed the unconscionability ruling for lack of statutory findings about disclosure/knowledge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Estate) | Defendant's Argument (Kathryn) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court improperly shifted burden of proof | Court forced Estate to go first and effectively required it to prove voluntariness | Kathryn notes no objection at trial; court acknowledged Kathryn bore the burden | Not preserved for review; court and parties consistently treated Kathryn as having burden; no reversible error |
| Whether Kathryn voluntarily signed the Agreement | Signature was voluntary: she had capacity, declined counsel, signed knowingly, no duress/undue influence shown | Signing was involuntary given deception by Paul, surprise presentation, short review time, limited education, relational control and fear of losing Paul | Affirmed — appellate court found no clear error in trial court’s factual finding that Kathryn did not voluntarily sign (totality of circumstances supported it) |
| Whether Agreement was unconscionable / unenforceable under SDCL provisions requiring disclosure | Agreement not unconscionable; Paul provided a financial disclosure and Kathryn had or could obtain adequate knowledge | Agreement leaves Kathryn with nothing and Paul’s disclosure minimized assets; overall factual context makes the waiver unconscionable | Reversed — trial court failed to make the statutory findings (fair/reasonable disclosure; written waiver of disclosure; adequate knowledge). Record does not support a conclusion that disclosure/knowledge requirements were unmet |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Estate of Smid, 756 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 2008) (discusses voluntariness of postnuptial waiver and limits on attacking a signed waiver absent wrongful conduct)
- Smetana v. Smetana, 726 N.W.2d 887 (S.D. 2007) (UPAA interpretation and close scrutiny of antenuptial agreements)
- Sanford v. Sanford, 694 N.W.2d 283 (S.D. 2005) (premarital agreements enforceable without consideration; disclosure principles)
- Ryken v. Ryken, 461 N.W.2d 122 (S.D. 1990) (adequate knowledge/disclosure standards for premarital agreements)
- Schutterle v. Schutterle, 260 N.W.2d 341 (S.D. 1977) (historical recognition of validity of antenuptial agreements and review for disproportionate terms)
- In re Estate of Gab, 364 N.W.2d 924 (S.D. 1985) (noting close scrutiny of postnuptial agreements because of confidential relationship between spouses)
