Estate of Edmund M. Carman v. Daniel Tinkes
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15242
| 7th Cir. | 2014Background
- Carman died after his car crashed into the rear of a pickup truck in Gary, Indiana.
- Estate brought state-law negligence claims in federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction with Indiana plaintiff and Illinois defendants.
- District court granted summary judgment for defendants; estate appeals.
- Material issue is whether the truck driver’s conduct or the aftermarket bumper could constitute actionable negligence.
- Court reviews summary judgment de novo and construes evidence in Carman’s favor, but finds no triable causation evidence.
- Undisputed facts show Carman approached a red light, speedily, without headlights, and collided with Tinkes’s truck which had lights on.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did a statutory traffic violation by Tinkes proximately cause Carman’s death? | Estate argues violations of Indiana codes 9-21-8-6 and 9-21-8-24 support fault. | Tinkes’s conduct could not be shown to proximately cause the rear-end collision. | No; statutory violation alone did not prove causation. |
| Could the after-market bumper be negligence per se or a breach of duty? | Bumper potentially hazardous and not immunized by regulatory compliance. | Bumper complied with regulations; no evidence of hazard or alternative bumper would have prevented injury. | Insufficient evidence to show bumper’s hazard or alternative bumper would have prevented Carman’s death. |
| Is there any triable issue that would defeat summary judgment on causation? | Estate relies on witness claiming move into left-turn lane; race to red light suggested by version. | Even accepting the account, no evidence that leaving the lane caused Carman to crash from behind. | No genuine issue; causation not shown. |
| Is the district court’s liability conclusion proper under Indiana causation principles? | Per se negligence from statute should support liability under causation. | Breach must proximately result in injury; statutory breach not enough without causal link. | Affirmed; no proximate-cause showing. |
Key Cases Cited
- Yost v. Wabash College, 3 N.E.3d 509 (Ind. 2014) (elements of negligence; duty, breach, proximate cause)
- Conway v. Evans, 549 N.E.2d 1092 (Ind. App. 1990) (negligence per se requires causal connection to injury)
- Northern Indiana Transit, Inc. v. Burk, 89 N.E.2d 905 (Ind. 1950) (breach of statutory duty must proximately cause injury)
- Lindsey v. DeGroot, 898 N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. App. 2009) (statutory violation must be causally linked to injury)
- City of South Bend v. Rozwarski's Estate, 404 N.E.2d 19 (Ind. App. 1980) (negligence per se requires causal connection to injury)
- Kramer v. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 6 N.E.3d 984 (Ind. App. 2014) (compliance with regulations does not immunize from negligence; need breach and causation evidence)
- Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 703 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 2012) (summary judgment standard applied to evidence in light most favorable to non-movant)