Estate of Darryl Houston Price v. Lori Jean Kosmalski, 492 Mich. 208

This action concerns the priority of liens on DeWitt, Michigan real property between a court-appointed receiver and a first-recorded mortgagee, Dart Bank.
Dart foreclosed by advertisement under a mortgage executed August 8, 2003; the property went to Dart after a sheriffs sale in 2008.
A receivership was initiated in April 2008 with Thomas Woods appointed as receiver to preserve and sell the property.
The receiver incurred about $41,875 in expenses for repairs, maintenance, and related fees.
The circuit court ordered a first-priority lien in favor of the receiver’s expenses over Dart’s mortgage, which the Court of Appeals affirmed; this Court granted review.
The core legal question is whether MCL 600.3236 controls priority in a foreclosure-by-advertisement context and whether the mortgagee must expressly consent to the receivership to bear its costs.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether MCL 600.3236 controls priority over the common-law rule.	Dart argues statutory priority over any later receiver liens.	Receiver argues common-law priority should trump statutory priority.	Statute controls; priority remains with preexisting mortgage.
Whether a mortgagee must expressly consent to the receivership to be liable for costs.	Dart did not consent but benefited from the receivership.	Bailey and Fisk permit waiver by consent; acquiescence suffices.	Explicit consent is not required here; waiver must be explicit under the statute, so Dart is not liable.
Whether acquiescence or beneficial receipt can waive statutory priority.	Receiver seeks waiver by acquiescence and benefit to Dart.	Acquiescence can result in waiver according to Bailey/Fisk.	Acquiescence alone is not enough to waive; explicit waiver required under statute.
What is the proper remedy given the priority and waiver analysis?	Receiver seeks payment from Dart's proceeds.	Statutory priority prevents receiver from being paid before Dart.	Remand for entry of an order in Dart’s favor consistent with statute.
Should courts apply MCR 2.622(D) to allocate receivership costs?	Court rule could direct payment responsibilities.	Not necessary if statutory priority applies.	Court should consider MCR 2.622(D) in future receivership appointments to allocate costs.

Bailey v Bailey, 262 Mich 215 (1933) (waiver can occur by consent or acquiescence when preserving property)
Fisk v Fisk, 333 Mich 513 (1952) (receiverships may bear costs when parties consent; property preservation rationale)
Attica Hydraulic Exch v Seslar, 264 Mich App 577 (2004) (receiver's expenses generally follow property; limited applicability outside context)
In re Dissolution of Henry Smith Floral Co, 260 Mich 299 (1932) (administrative costs of receivership have priority over receiver's certificates)
Detroit Trust Co v Detroit City Serv Co, 262 Mich 14 (1933) (receiver costs prioritized to preserve assets; timely exhaustion of funds prior to dividends)
In re Rite-Way Tool & Mfg Co, 333 Mich 551 (1952) (receiver's costs follow a priority scheme in liquidation of receivership assets)