Estate of Claudette Sheltra, 2020 ME 108

Claudette Sheltra executed a 2006 will that revoked prior wills; she died January 7, 2015. Paul Sheltra obtained informal probate and was appointed personal representative in February 2015.
On January 25, 2018, Janet Sheltra (pro se) filed two petitions: formal probate of a 2004 will and removal of Paul as personal representative. Paul opposed and moved for summary judgment on statute-of-limitations grounds (18-A M.R.S. § 3-108).
Janet submitted a noncompliant pro se response alleging fear and incapacity that prevented earlier filing. On May 15, 2018 the probate court granted Paul’s summary judgment as to the formal-probate petition as time barred but left the removal petition and other proceedings pending.
The parties later mediated (unsuccessfully), obtained new counsel, and proceeded to trial on remaining matters; Paul sought a complete settlement and attorney fees incurred defending against Janet’s petitions.
On July 1, 2019 the court entered an order directing distribution per the 2006 will and awarded Paul $22,995.97 in attorney fees to be paid out of Janet’s share of the estate.
Janet appealed; the Court addressed whether her appeal from the May 15, 2018 summary judgment was timely and whether the fee award (and its allocation) was proper.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness of appeal from summary judgment dismissing formal-probate petition	Janet: summary judgment not final because other probate proceedings (removal, settlement) remained; appeal filed within 21 days of July 1, 2019 order was timely	Paul: each subsidiary probate petition is an independent proceeding; summary judgment on May 15, 2018 was final for that subsidiary docket and started the 21-day appeal clock	Court: summary judgment disposed of the subsidiary docket; appeal from that judgment was untimely and is dismissed
Attorney-fee award and allocation under 18-A M.R.S. § 1-601	Janet: court failed to credit her good-faith litigation and abused discretion by ordering fees paid solely from her share of the estate	Paul: fees were incurred defending estate and therefore allowable under § 1-601	Court: award of fees to Paul for work benefiting the estate was permissible, but directing payment solely from Janet’s share was improper; modify order to charge fees to the estate pro rata between beneficiaries

In re Adoption of Matthew R., 750 A.2d 1262 (Me. 2000) (reiterating final-judgment rule: only final judgments ripe for appeal)
Safety Ins. Group v. Dawson, 116 A.3d 948 (Me. 2015) (defining final judgment as disposing of entire matter pending)
In re Estate of Newalla, 837 P.2d 1373 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (orders disposing of matters raised in a probate petition are final and appealable even if other probate matters remain)
Scott v. Scott, 136 P.3d 892 (Colo. 2006) (discussing when multiple probate filings constitute independent proceedings)
Schmidt v. Schmidt, 540 N.W.2d 605 (N.D. 1995) (similar holding on appealability of orders disposing of one probate petition)
Thomas v. BFC Marine/Bath Fuel Co., 843 A.2d 3 (Me. 2004) (time limits for appeals are jurisdictional)
Estate of Ricci, 827 A.2d 817 (Me. 2003) (standards for awarding attorney fees under § 1-601; focus on benefit to the estate; review for abuse of discretion)
Estate of McCormick, 765 A.2d 552 (Me. 2001) (probate statute does not authorize surcharging opposing litigants personally; fees must come from the estate)
Estate of Rosen, 520 A.2d 700 (Me. 1987) (fees awarded out of the estate should be borne pro rata by beneficiaries)
Guardianship of Ard, 154 A.3d 609 (Me. 2017) (in absence of requested findings, appellate courts infer necessary factual findings supported by the record)