Estate of Black v. Clark
135 So. 3d 181
| Miss. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- Carl Black executed wills in 2007 and 2009; the 2009 will expressly revoked all prior wills and omitted Ida M. Black, who had been a contingent beneficiary in 2007.
- 2007 will left entire estate to Carl’s brother Ivy, with a savings/residuary clause giving Ivy’s share to Ivy’s wife Ida if Ivy predeceased Carl; 2009 will reduced Ivy’s share, gave specific devises to Ivy, Jerry Clark, and Shane Clark, and contained a remainder dividing the residuary among Ivy, Jerry, and Shane "share and share alike."
- Ivy died April 19, 2011; Carl died April 23, 2011; Jerry (stepson) petitioned to probate the 2009 will.
- Ida counterclaimed arguing the 2007 will should control (or parol evidence should be allowed to show Carl intended Ida to take if Ivy predeceased him); chancery court dismissed Ida’s counterclaim under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
- Chancellor concluded the 2009 will was unambiguous and, as written, resulted in Ivy’s share passing to Ivy’s intestate heirs; parol evidence was therefore inadmissible.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2009 will is ambiguous such that parol evidence may show Carl intended Ida to receive Ivy’s share | Ida: omission of the savings clause was inadvertent; Carl intended Ida to take Ivy’s share if Ivy predeceased him | Jerry: 2009 will unambiguously revoked prior wills and its plain language controls, excluding parol evidence | Court: 2009 will is unambiguous; only one legal disposition follows, so parol evidence inadmissible; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether the chancellor erred as a matter of law in refusing to admit extrinsic evidence | Ida: extrinsic evidence should be admitted to show testator’s intent and correct an omission | Jerry: extrinsic evidence cannot vary unambiguous testamentary language | Court: applied de novo review to legal question and found no error; only manifest error/factual review remained |
| Whether substantial evidence supports the chancellor’s factual findings about the will’s legal operation | Ida: factual circumstances (attorney error, testator intent to avoid intestacy) show different outcome should be recognized | Jerry: text of will yields single legal result irrespective of alleged intent | Court: substantial evidence supports chancellor’s interpretation that the will produces one result (Ivy’s share passes intestate) |
| Whether the Rule 12(b)(6) hearing was impermissibly converted to summary-judgment | Ida: parties did not brief conversion issue; implied concern about procedure | Jerry: no conversion argued below | Court: parties did not contend conversion; court did not address conversion issue further; dismissal stands |
Key Cases Cited
- Stovall v. Stovall, 860 So.2d 679 (Miss. 2003) (parol evidence inadmissible where will language is unambiguous)
- Seal v. Seal, 312 So.2d 19 (Miss. 1975) (same rule on construing wills and parol evidence)
- In re Estate of Langston, 57 So.3d 618 (Miss. 2011) (standard of review for chancery factual findings and legal error)
- In re Last Will & Testament of Roland, 920 So.2d 539 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (attorney testimony of intent cannot overcome plain language of unambiguous will)