Estate Land Co. v. Wiese
546 S.W.3d 322
| Tex. App. | 2017Background
- Aaron and Tony Wiese (brothers) and Kamal Bannan purchased multiple Houston properties; Tony later sued for partition and reimbursement.
- Trial court found properties not partitionable in kind, appointed receiver Donald Worley, and ordered partition by sale under Rule 770; an amended final judgment was entered in May 2013.
- Receiver marketed 110–114 Main; trial court approved Zimmerman Interests contract and, after closing, signed a First Amended Decree Confirming Sale (Dec. 18, 2015) approving the sale and directing net proceeds be distributed after payment of indebtedness, mortgages, liens, encumbrances, and reasonable fees.
- Trial court signed a Turnover Order (Dec. 23, 2015) directing title company (Stewart Title) to turn over net sale proceeds to the receiver, who would deposit them in an IOLTA and distribute per the final judgment.
- 110–114 Main was sold on Dec. 30, 2015; appellants appealed the two post-judgment orders on Jan. 18, 2016, challenging deductions and the receiver/turnover procedure.
- The court dismissed the appeal as moot because the property had been sold and appellants did not obtain a stay or supersedeas to prevent distribution of proceeds; it noted partition proceedings are two-step and many issues had to be appealed earlier.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the post-judgment Decree Confirming Sale and Turnover Order exceeded jurisdiction by allowing payment of Aaron's indebtedness from net proceeds | Appellants: orders materially modified the final judgment by permitting payments to extinguish Aaron's promissory obligation without specific findings; orders impermissibly enforced/changed final judgment | Appellee (Tony): appeal is moot because sale occurred before appellate challenge; alternatively, orders were proper | Appeal dismissed as moot; court declined to reach merits because property sale was completed and no stay sought |
| Whether objections to deductions (mortgages, liens, receiver/legal/broker fees) required pre-sale appeal | Appellants: trial court failed to make required findings that deductions extinguished valid encumbrances or were reasonable fees | Appellee: such challenges must be made earlier or are part of prior final judgment; receiver had authority to close and distribute | Court held issues tied to the earlier final judgment/process and must have been appealed at the proper stage; dismissal for mootness affirmed |
| Whether the Turnover Order improperly compelled title company (possibly without jurisdiction) to release funds to receiver | Appellants: Turnover Order asserted jurisdiction over title company and directed funds to receiver rather than "return into court" per final judgment | Appellee: turnover was needed to close sale and effect distribution consistent with judgment | Court did not reach merits; disposition dismissed as moot because sale closed |
| Whether this court could render relief post-sale that would have practical effect | Appellants: relief altering distribution or voiding parts of orders would still have practical effect (offsets, repayment, future distributions) | Appellee: once sale and distribution occur without a stay, appellate relief is impractical and moot | Majority: no practical effect; appeal moot. Dissent: actual controversy remains and appellate relief could have practical effect; would not dismiss on mootness grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- Griffin v. Wolfe, 610 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1981) (partition proceedings are two-step; both steps yield appealable final judgments)
- Long v. Spencer, 137 S.W.3d 923 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004) (intermediate partition/sale orders must be appealed before sale to prevent irreparable consequences)
- Ellis v. First City Nat'l Bank, 864 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1993) (second-step partition order approving sale is separate final judgment)
- Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. 1999) (mootness doctrine and prohibition on advisory opinions)
- State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. 2015) (mootness implicates subject-matter jurisdiction)
