Esprit v. State, 305 Ga. 429

On Sept. 15, 2008 Maximillion Stevenson (a drug dealer) was shot and killed; Brisean Esprit and Mark Jones were tried jointly for murders and related firearms offenses.
Evidence at trial: eyewitnesses placed both men in Stevenson's car; two .45 shell casings found; clothing stained with victim's blood recovered near a witness's house; one witness (Robateau) testified Jones told him after the shooting that he and Esprit tried to rob Stevenson and Jones shot him.
On the first day of trial Jones attempted a plea deal and made on-the-record statements exculpating Esprit; the prosecutor withdrew the plea after Jones’s statements and the court denied Esprit’s motion to sever; Esprit’s counsel did not seek admission of Jones’s plea-hearing statements at the joint trial.
Esprit was convicted of felony murder and related firearm offense; Jones was convicted of malice murder and related offenses.
Esprit appealed claiming ineffective assistance for failing to admit Jones’s plea-hearing statements (including under Chambers due-process theory). Jones appealed the admission of similar-transaction evidence of an armed robbery he committed in Houston three days later.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Esprit's trial counsel was ineffective for not admitting Jones's withdrawn plea-hearing statements to impeach Jones's out-of-court statements to Robateau	Esprit: counsel should have (1) sought admission to impeach Jones's hearsay statements after Robateau testified, or (2) invoked Chambers to admit the statements as critical, trustworthy evidence	State/Jones: admission was barred or highly doubtful under existing precedent (withdrawn pleas exclusion, co-defendant context); statements were unreliable and only useful for limited impeachment; counsel reasonably pursued other impeachment avenues	Court: No ineffective assistance. Counsel’s failure to pursue novel, extension-of-law theories was not objectively unreasonable; Chambers claim would be meritless given lack of reliability and availability for cross-examination
Whether the trial court erred by admitting similar-transaction evidence (Houston armed robbery)	Jones: the Houston incident was not sufficiently similar, so admission was prejudicial character evidence	State: evidence showed motive/bent-of-mind and factual similarities (gun, accomplice, robbery of drug-dealer) and there was sufficient proof Jones committed the Houston offense	Court: Admission was within discretion under similar-transaction doctrine; similarities and proof sufficed; limiting instruction given

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (legal-sufficiency standard for convictions)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance two-prong test)
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (due-process exception for reliable, critical exculpatory evidence)
Williams v. State, 304 Ga. 455 (counsel not required to argue beyond existing precedent)
Robbins v. State, 300 Ga. 387 (prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence when declarant testifies and is cross-examined)
Grell v. State, 291 Ga. 615 (rule limiting third-party confessions for accused's benefit)
Bertholf v. State, 298 Ga. App. 612 (withdrew-plea impeachment problematic when witness is co-defendant at joint trial)