Espinoza v. Shiomoto
10 Cal. App. 5th 85
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- At ~1:40 a.m. officers stopped Bernice Espinoza for apparent phone use while driving; officers smelled a strong odor of alcohol, observed red/watery eyes, and noted some stumble/fumbling and emotional behavior. She admitted one drink earlier.
- Espinoza refused to exit the vehicle and refused field sobriety tests, repeatedly stating she would not perform tests and asking for a citation instead; officers arrested her for DUI.
- At the jail she said she would submit to a blood test only if officers first obtained a warrant (citing McNeely); officers told her CHP policy was not to obtain warrants for blood draws except in felony DUI cases and that, absent a warrant, she must choose a breath test; she did not take a breath test.
- Officer Gonzalez served DS-367 notice and forwarded paperwork to the DMV; DMV hearing officer found probable cause to arrest, that Espinoza was admonished under implied consent law, and that her conditional consent to blood testing amounted to a refusal; DMV sustained a one-year license suspension.
- Espinoza petitioned for writ of administrative mandate; superior court denied the petition (no statement of decision). Espinoza appealed; the Court of Appeal affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Espinoza's Argument | Department's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Was the arrest supported by reasonable cause/probable cause for DUI? | Officers lacked reasonable cause; expert testified no objective impairment. | Odor of alcohol, bloodshot/watery eyes, stumbling/fumbling, refusal to perform tests and to exit provided reasonable cause. | Affirmed: substantial evidence supports probable cause and lawful arrest. |
| 2) Did Espinoza refuse to submit to a chemical test (so as to trigger implied‑consent suspension)? | Her conditional consent to blood testing (demanding a warrant per McNeely) was not a refusal; she invoked constitutional right against warrantless blood draw. | Conditional consent is treated as refusal; once blood was functionally unavailable she was obligated to take the breath test she refused. | Affirmed: her condition amounted to refusal; failure to take breath test independently supports suspension. |
| 3) Do McNeely/Birchfield change analysis for civil/admin suspension based on refusal to submit to blood or breath tests? | McNeely/Birchfield protect against warrantless blood draws so refusal to blood should not trigger suspension; suspension imposes an unconstitutional condition if based on asserting the warrant right. | Birchfield permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrest; refusal of breath test may support civil penalties. | Court: cautious — refusal to a warrantless blood draw alone may be problematic post‑Birchfield, but refusal to submit to a breath test (permitted incident to arrest) validly supports administrative suspension. |
| 4) Was Espinoza afforded a fair administrative hearing (due process)? | Hearing officer improperly disregarded expert testimony and committed factual errors, depriving due process. | Hearing afforded opportunity to present evidence; credibility determinations and minor errors do not show due process violation. | Affirmed: superior court’s implied finding that hearing was fair is supported; credibility decisions entitled to deference. |
Key Cases Cited
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (U.S. 1966) (compulsory blood test is a Fourth Amendment search; warrant generally required absent exigency)
- McNeely v. Missouri, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (U.S. 2013) (natural dissipation of alcohol does not create a per se exigency; warrant analysis is case‑by‑case)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (U.S. 2016) (breath tests may be administered as search incident to arrest; blood tests are more intrusive and generally require a warrant)
- MacDonald v. Gutierrez, 32 Cal.4th 150 (Cal. 2004) (purposes and framework of administrative per se DMV suspensions)
- People v. McNeal, 46 Cal.4th 1183 (Cal. 2009) (evidence of impairment includes appearance, odor, speech, motor skills)
- Arthur v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 184 Cal.App.4th 1199 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (standard of review in DMV suspension writs; administrative findings entitled to strong presumption)