Espinoza v. Arkansas Valley Adventures, LLC
809 F.3d 1150
| 10th Cir. | 2016Background
- Sue Ann Apolinar signed a pre-trip "release of liability" before a guided overnight rafting trip in Brown’s Canyon, Colorado; the raft later capsized and she drowned after becoming trapped in a logjam.
- Her son, Jesus Espinoza, Jr., sued the rafting company asserting negligence per se and fraud (other claims dropped); the company moved for summary judgment relying on the signed release.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the company; the Tenth Circuit (Gorsuch, J.) affirmed.
- Colorado law permits enforcement of recreational liability waivers unless public-policy factors (Jones test) or contract-specific defects render them unenforceable.
- Plaintiff argued the Colorado River Outfitters Act (CROA) criminalizes careless operation, making negligence per se a public concern that should defeat enforcement of the release.
- The court rejected that argument, finding CROA did not displace the common-law Jones framework and that the release satisfied all four Jones factors (public policy and contract-specific factors).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enforceability of recreational negligence waiver under Colorado law | waiver shouldn’t bar negligence per se claim because CROA makes careless operation a misdemeanor, converting rafting into a public-service context | Colorado common law allows waivers for recreational activities; CROA’s criminal penalties don’t displace common-law waiver rules | Waiver enforceable; CROA does not change Jones balancing or bar private release of negligence claims |
| Distinction between negligence per se and common-law negligence for waiver purposes | negligence per se is materially different and should not be waived | negligence per se here is coextensive with common-law duty, so no meaningful difference justifying different treatment | No meaningful analytical distinction in this context; negligence per se did not prevent enforcement of waiver |
| Whether the release was fairly entered into (Jones factor 3) | company misled plaintiff about trip difficulty (class III vs class IV) and may have applied pressure to sign | plaintiff received detailed, clear on-site warnings and signed a conspicuous release; prior statements were superseded | Release was fairly entered into as a matter of law; no genuine issue that would void assent |
| Whether the release’s language was clear and unambiguous (Jones factor 4) | prior representations and alleged misstatements undermine clarity and reliance | the written form prominently warned of death and listed hazards and clearly waived claims; superseded prior communications | Release language was clear and unambiguous; satisfied Jones factor 4 |
Key Cases Cited
- Boles v. Sun Ergoline, 223 P.3d 724 (Colo. 2010) (intentional/reckless-misconduct releases unenforceable on public-policy grounds)
- Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981) (four-factor test for enforceability of liability waivers)
- Chadwick v. Colt Ross Outfitters, Inc., 100 P.3d 465 (Colo. 2004) (recreational businesses not treated as providing essential public services)
- Lombard v. Colorado Outdoor Educ. Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565 (Colo. 2008) (negligence-per-se framework often parallels common-law negligence)
- B & B Livery, Inc. v. Riehl, 960 P.2d 134 (Colo. 1998) (upholding waivers in equine/recreational context despite statutory schemes)
- Vinton v. Virzi, 269 P.3d 1242 (Colo. 2012) (no reasonable reliance on prior misrepresentations once true facts are disclosed)
- Forman v. Brown, 944 P.2d 559 (Colo. App. 1996) (enforcement of rafting releases under Colorado law)