Esparraguera v. Department of the Army
Civil Action No. 2021-0421
| D.D.C. | Mar 24, 2022Background:
- Maria Esparraguera, an SES attorney at the Department of the Army, was removed from the SES under 5 U.S.C. § 3592 for "less than fully successful executive performance" after an OSC complaint about a hiring decision.
- SES employees removed under §3592 receive only an informal hearing; Esparraguera had such a hearing, the presiding official transmitted the record, and the Merit Systems Protection Board (Merit Board) took no further action.
- She sought reconsideration from the Under Secretary, then pursued review in the Federal Circuit, which held it lacked jurisdiction because there was no final Merit Board order.
- Esparraguera sued in district court alleging (1) deprivation of a property interest in her SES position in violation of the Fifth Amendment and (2) an APA/CSRA claim challenging the Merit Board’s failure to issue a formal decision.
- Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim; the Court dismissed the statutory/APA claim for lack of jurisdiction and dismissed the constitutional claim for failure to plead a protected property interest.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| District court jurisdiction over APA/CSRA statutory challenge to Merit Board inaction | Esparraguera: may use APA to challenge Merit Board’s failure to issue a formal order | Defendants: CSRA provides the exclusive remedial scheme; only final Merit Board orders are reviewable and appeals go to the Federal Circuit | Court: CSRA is exclusive; district court lacks jurisdiction to hear the statutory/APA claim |
| District court jurisdiction over constitutional (due process) claims arising from CSRA-covered actions | Esparraguera: constitutional due process claim is reviewable in district court | Defendants: CSRA precludes district-court review of such employment disputes | Court: District courts may hear colorable constitutional claims despite CSRA’s exclusivity (no heightened showing that Congress barred all judicial review) |
| Whether Esparraguera had a protected property interest in SES employment (and exhaustion) | Esparraguera: argues a property interest exists (invokes §7543 “for cause” language) | Defendants: SES removal under §3592 is permissive ("at any time for less than fully successful executive performance") and does not create an entitlement; exhaustion of admin remedies required | Court: Exhaustion satisfied; no statutory language creating a "for cause" entitlement to SES status, so no protected property interest; due process claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988) (CSRA provides detailed remedial scheme for federal employment actions)
- Esparraguera v. Dep’t of the Army, 981 F.3d 1328 (2020) (Federal Circuit previously held it lacked jurisdiction absent a final Merit Board decision)
- Filebark v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 555 F.3d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (CSRA preempts APA challenges to agency employment actions)
- Fornaro v. James, 416 F.3d 63 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (reiterating exclusivity of CSRA’s remedial scheme)
- Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 567 U.S. 1 (2012) (CSRA’s structure indicates Congress intended to foreclose district-court review of covered employment disputes)
- Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (property-interest/due-process framework for public employment removals)
- Garrow v. Gramm, 856 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (no property interest absent statutory "for cause" or comparable limitations on discharge)
- Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (protected property interest requires a legitimate claim of entitlement)