Esler v. Sylvia-Reardon, 473 Mass. 775

Esler, a long‑time hemodialysis RN at Massachusetts General Hospital, took FMLA leave beginning November 14, 2008, for a serious medical condition; the hospital approved 12 weeks of leave through February 6, 2009.
While on leave Esler injured her wrist in New York, required surgery, and obtained a physician’s note clearing her to return on February 16, 2009 with a restriction of no lifting >5 lbs with left hand and need to wear a splint intermittently.
Supervisor Sylvia‑Reardon criticized Esler for being in New York while on leave, warned Esler her job was in jeopardy, and instructed cancellation of an occupational health assessment; the hospital placed Esler on inactive status citing inability to perform job with restrictions.
Before Esler’s FMLA expired, Sylvia‑Reardon hired and then announced that part‑time nurse Crisileo would replace Esler; Crisileo would not be fully trained to perform all duties until April 2009.
Esler sued for FMLA retaliation; a jury found for Esler and awarded substantial back and front pay. The trial judge granted defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.) but held front pay was a matter for the court and that the record did not support front pay. The Appeals Court reversed the judgment n.o.v. and affirmed the front pay ruling; the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether evidence was sufficient to support FMLA retaliation verdict	Esler: circumstantial evidence (close temporal proximity, supervisor’s disparaging comments, early hire of replacement, improving condition) shows termination was retaliatory	Hospital: Esler couldn’t perform essential duties at return and termination was for nondiscriminatory, legitimate reasons	SJC: Evidence sufficient to permit reasonable inference of retaliatory motive; verdict reinstated (judgment n.o.v. reversed)
Standard and review for judgment n.o.v.	Esler: view record in light most favorable to verdict, draw reasonable inferences favoring nonmovant	Defendants: argued no legally sufficient evidence to support jury finding	SJC: confirmed standard (view evidence for nonmovant; McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting applies) and found record met it
Whether front pay is for jury or judge	Esler: jury awarded front pay	Hospital: front pay is equitable and for judge	SJC: front pay under FMLA is equitable; judge decides it; trial judge properly denied front pay on record
Whether trial court’s handling of alternative new‑trial request was adequate	Esler: not at issue	Defendants: sought new trial in alternative to judgment n.o.v.; judge failed to specify ruling on alternative motion	SJC: remanded so trial court can address defendants’ alternative new‑trial motion with required specificity

O'Brien v. Pearson, 449 Mass. 377 (discussing standard for viewing evidence on post‑trial motions)
Phelan v. May Dep't Stores Co., 443 Mass. 52 (standard for judgment n.o.v. review)
Cahaly v. Benistar Prop. Exch. Trust Co., 451 Mass. 343 (importance of jury verdicts)
Colburn v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div., 429 F.3d 325 (recognizing FMLA retaliation claim despite inability to return after 12 weeks)
Henry v. United Bank, 686 F.3d 50 (FMLA substantive and remedial provisions)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination/retaliation cases)
Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151 (application of McDonnell Douglas in FMLA context)
Traxler v. Multnomah County, 596 F.3d 1007 (treating front pay as equitable for judge)
Arban v. West Publ. Corp., 345 F.3d 390 (contrasting view—jury may decide front pay)
Johnson v. Spencer Press of Me., Inc., 364 F.3d 368 (treating front pay as equitable remedy)
Turnpike Motors, Inc. v. Newbury Group, Inc., 413 Mass. 119 (procedural requirement to specify grounds when granting new trial)