Eskew v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE
958 N.E.2d 426
Ill. App. Ct.2011Background
- Eskew, legally blind, died after being struck attempting to cross at Berwyn station while awaiting the 1:14 p.m. eastbound train operated by BNSF under a purchase of service with Metra; the Berwyn station is a three-track, rail-adjacent platform area with crossing gates and bells; the Berwyn station is in a quiet zone; the 1:14 p.m. train was rerouted to the north track that day due to a freight train on the center track; the crossing gates were down and bells were ringing when Eskew was struck; plaintiffs allege multiple failures in communication, warnings, and safety design at the station; the jury allocated 85% liability to BNSF, 10% to Metra, and 5% to Eskew, leading to a $4.75 million judgment in favor of Eskew’s estate; Eskew’s family sued BNSF and Metra for negligence related to communications, public address system, and safety design; the trial court denied posttrial motions and motions for juror misconduct hearing; defendants appeal on multiple grounds; the appellate court affirms.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the jury instructions properly defined the duty of care owed to Eskew as a passenger. | Eskew was a passenger; common carrier duties apply. | Eskew was not boarding a train and thus not a passenger at the moment of the accident. | Yes; common carrier owes highest duty to passengers; Eskew, on the platform, was within carrier control. |
| Whether ordinary care applies to claims about station design and public address system. | Premises-liability standards should apply to station design deficiencies. | Ordinary care governs premises defects; design elements fall within higher duty only if passenger-related. | The ordinary-care standard governs premises claims, but here the claim concerns operation of the train, so ordinary-care instruction would be inappropriate. |
| Whether the court properly instructed the jury on the additional duty to a known disabled passenger and related warning obligations. | Eskew’s disability created an elevated duty to warn and protect. | No special heightened duty unless Eskew was accepted for carriage and known to be disabled. | Evidence supported an added duty; any error was not prejudicial given the circumstances. |
| Whether admitting Eskew’s careful-habits testimony and the related instruction was proper. | Habit evidence helps prove Eskew’s safety-conscious behavior. | In presence of eyewitnesses, habit evidence is unnecessary and potentially prejudicial. | The careful-habits instruction was properly admitted and did not constitute reversible error. |
| Whether the trial court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on juror misconduct based on a juror’s blog. | Blog posts show potential extraneous influence requiring voir dire. | No concrete showing of prejudicial extraneous influence; must show specifics. | No abuse of discretion; extraneous information was not shown to prejudice the verdict. |
Key Cases Cited
- Katamay v. Chicago Transit Authority, 53 Ill.2d 27 (1972) (common carrier owes highest duty of care to passengers)
- Skelton v. Chicago Transit Authority, 214 Ill.App.3d 554 (1991) (premises liability vs. operation—when premises standard applies)
- Auton v. Logan Landfill, Inc., 105 Ill.2d 537 (1984) (evidence preservation of claims; habit evidence rule footing)
- Davis v. South Side Elevated R.R. Co., 292 Ill. 378 (1920) (ordinary care standard for premises safety in rail context)
- Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Ry. Co., 165 Ill.2d 107 (1995) (ICC device approval not conclusive for non-ICC premises claims)
- In re A.W., 231 Ill.2d 241 (2008) (ADA compliance not dispositive in common-law negligence claim)
- Ryan v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 381 Ill.App.3d 877 (2008) (construction-repose applicability; not applicable to maintenance claims)
- Trtanj v. City of Granite City, 379 Ill.App.3d 795 (2008) (construction-related repose distinctions clarified)
- Willmer v. Willmer, 396 Ill.App.3d 175 (2009) (extraneous information prejudice jurisprudence; standard of prejudice)
- Stallings v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 342 Ill.App.3d 676 (2003) (premature deliberations; intra-jury influence)
- Runge v. People, 234 Ill.2d 68 (2009) (premature deliberations; required open mind until submission)