370 P.3d 104
Wyo.2016Background
- Ernest Ray Watts was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and battery for severely injuring his girlfriend, Diana Lynch, after an in-home altercation; Lynch testified Watts punched her and medical testimony corroborated injuries.
- Watts testified the injuries were accidental (a plant fell on her); the State presented testimony from ER physician and surgeon supporting multiple blunt-force blows.
- During closing argument the prosecutor made two contested statements: (1) that the presumption of innocence "no longer exists" once the State has proved its case, and (2) an attempted definition/explanation of "reasonable doubt" (stating it is not a hunch or mere possibility and giving an illustrative example).
- Watts did not object at trial; on appeal he raised a cumulative prosecutorial misconduct claim invoking plain error review.
- The district court had given standard jury instructions on presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt and told jurors arguments are not evidence.
- The Wyoming Supreme Court found both prosecutor statements were improper (violating clear legal rules) but concluded the errors were isolated, the evidence of guilt was strong, and the cumulative effect did not prejudice Watts; conviction affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether cumulative prosecutorial misconduct denied a fair trial | Watts: prosecutor misstated law on presumption of innocence and improperly defined reasonable doubt; combined errors prejudiced him | State: statements were isolated, within closing latitude, jurors were properly instructed, no prejudice | Court: Both statements were prosecutorial misconduct but cumulative effect was not prejudicial; conviction affirmed |
| Whether prosecutor may tell jury presumption of innocence "no longer exists" after State proves its case | Watts: statement incorrectly removes presumption before jury verdict | State: closing argument latitude; jury instructions cure any argument error | Court: Statement violated clear law — presumption remains until jury finds guilt beyond reasonable doubt |
| Whether prosecutor may define/explain "reasonable doubt" in closing | Watts: prosecutor impermissibly defined reasonable doubt (e.g., "not a hunch") | State: some explanation of burden (not absolute certainty) is allowed; line can be thin | Court: Prosecutor crossed the line and defined reasonable doubt — misconduct occurred |
| Whether isolated improper remarks in closing justify reversal under plain-error review | Watts: cumulative errors warrant reversal despite no contemporaneous objection | State: errors were limited, jury instructions and strong evidence negate prejudice | Court: No reversal — errors were limited in scope, instructions likely cured, overwhelming evidence of guilt |
Key Cases Cited
- Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (establishes presumption of innocence principle)
- Mahorney v. Wallman, 917 F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1990) (prosecutor remarks removing presumption were impermissible)
- Cosco v. State, 521 P.2d 1345 (Wyo. 1974) (confusing definitions of reasonable doubt reversible)
- Blakely v. State, 542 P.2d 857 (Wyo. 1975) (prohibiting attempts to define reasonable doubt)
- Rivera v. State, 987 P.2d 678 (Wyo. 1999) (explaining burden is not absolute certainty; limited explanations may be permissible)
- Solis v. State, 315 P.3d 622 (Wyo. 2013) (prosecutor may explain burden is not beyond all doubt, but may not define reasonable doubt)
