Ernest Fenton v. Kelli Dudley
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14872
7th Cir.2014Background
- Davis sued Fenton for malpractice and Fair Housing Act discrimination; case stayed pending arbitration.
- Fenton sued Dudley and Sidea in state court alleging defamation, conversion, tortious interference, seeking damages and injunction.
- Dudley and Sidea removed to federal court under §1441 and §1443; district court remanded as not removable.
- Cook County Circuit Court issued an ex parte preliminary injunction against Dudley and Sidea after removal.
- District court remand order upheld; §1443 appeal arises under §1447(d); court analyzes under Rachel and Peacock frameworks.
- Court affirms remand, concluding §1443(1) does not authorize removal here; FH Act rights do not confer immunity from state-court proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether removal under §1443(1) was proper. | Dudley/Sidea contend FH Act rights justify removal. | Fenton argues no federal equal-rights denial or enforcement barrier exists. | Not removable under §1443(1). |
| Whether the state injunction supports removal as a formal expression of state law. | Injunction shows state-law expression affecting rights. | Injunction is not a general state law expression; not enough for removal. | Injunction does not satisfy Rachel/Peacock criteria for removal. |
| Whether Rachel/Peacock framework supports removal where FH Act lacks explicit anti-prosecution language. | FH Act retaliation could remove under §1443(1). | No explicit anti-prosecution or immunity language; cannot remove. | FH Act does not provide the requisite removal basis; not removable. |
Key Cases Cited
- Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966) (limits ‘equal civil rights’ to race-based rights and requires denial of enforcement in state court)
- City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966) (set out limitations of §1443(1) when no federal right to immunity from state prosecution is present)
- Emigrant Savings Bank v. Elan Management Corp., 668 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1982) (held removal under §1443(1) requires explicit or equivalent anti-prosecution language)
- Whatley v. City of Vidalia, 399 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1968) (advocated broader anti-coercion approach for removal under §1443(1))
- Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213 (1975) (noted the boundary between Rachel and Peacock on §1443(1) removability)
- Davis v. Glanton, 107 F.3d 1044 (3d Cir. 1997) (cites limits on anti-retaliation removal theories)