Ernest D. Suggs v. State of Florida, 238 So. 3d 699

Background

Victim Pauline Casey was found murdered in August 1990; Suggs was arrested after his vehicle matched BOLO tire impressions and other evidence (victim’s fingerprints in his car, blood on his shirt, a bar key and glass found near his home, cash in wet bills found at his home, and cellmate statements).
Suggs was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and robbery; jury recommended death (7–5), and the trial court imposed death after finding multiple aggravators and limited mitigators.
Suggs’s initial appeal and his first postconviction relief motion were previously denied; this appeal challenges the summary denial of a successive 3.851 motion filed in 2015.
The successive motion raised five categories of new evidence/Brady claims: (1) alleged sexual abuse by the victim’s husband (purported motive); (2) alleged undisclosed/diver-related details about the bay search and how a bar key was located; (3) post hoc statements by the sentencing judge suggesting deference to the jury; (4) later-discredited FBI analyst Michael Malone’s involvement; and (5) an FDLE investigation and alleged misconduct by the sheriff and prosecutor in a contemporaneous case.
The circuit court summarily denied relief; the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the denials de novo and affirmed, concluding none of the alleged new evidence or nondisclosures were material or would probably produce an acquittal or different sentence.

Issues

Issue	Suggs’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
1. Newly discovered evidence of husband’s motive (alleged sexual abuse of daughter)	The abuse evidence shows motive for husband to kill victim and should be newly admissible evidence warranting a new trial	The evidence does not show the victim knew of the abuse or link it to motive; would be irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial	Denied — evidence inadmissible and not likely to produce acquittal
2. Brady: search of bay/key discovery (diver testimony of Trusty directing search; water line on Suggs)	Diver’s recent statements show trial testimony was incomplete/misleading and key may have been planted or the search directed, warranting Brady relief	Alleged statements are consistent with trial testimony, speculative without recantation or affidavit, and not material to undermine verdict	Denied — not material under Brady; confidence in verdict unaffected
3. Newly discovered evidence re: sentencing judge’s remarks	Judge’s memoir/letter show she deferred to jury and shifted responsibility, violating requirement of independent judicial sentencing	Judge’s sentencing order shows required findings; judge’s later statements are inadmissible thoughts and would not likely change a new penalty outcome	Denied — inadmissible and not likely to change sentence
4. Brady: FBI analyst Malone’s involvement	Malone was later discredited; nondisclosure of this undermines forensic reliability and is Brady material	Malone’s role in Suggs’s case was limited, did not inculpate Suggs, and Malone did not testify; no reasonable probability of different result	Denied — not material to outcome
5. Brady: FDLE investigation and alleged misconduct by sheriff/prosecutor	Undisclosed FDLE probe and contemporaneous misconduct would impeach state witnesses and show systemic issues	Evidence of unrelated misconduct is inadmissible for propensity/impeachment and would not be admissible at trial	Denied — not admissible or material
6. Cumulative effect of all new allegations	Combined newly discovered/Brady evidence would undermine confidence in verdict	Individual allegations lack materiality; cumulatively they do not change the reasonable probability analysis	Denied — cumulative effect insufficient to warrant new trial or resentencing

Key Cases Cited

Suggs v. State, 644 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1994) (direct-appeal decision summarizing trial and penalty-phase evidence)
Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1998) (standard for newly discovered evidence to warrant new trial)
Hunter v. State, 29 So. 3d 256 (Fla. 2008) (de novo review of summary denial of postconviction claims)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution duty to disclose materially exculpatory evidence)
Mordenti v. State, 894 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 2004) (Brady materiality standard quoting Strickler)
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (defining reasonable probability standard for Brady)
Allen v. State, 854 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 2003) (Brady materiality framing)
Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2003) (speculative exculpatory evidence insufficient for Brady relief)
Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 2009) (newly discovered sentencing evidence must probably yield a less severe sentence)
Foster v. State, 132 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2013) (private thoughts of factfinders inhere in verdict and are not independently reviewable)
Roberts v. State, 840 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 2002) (relief where ex parte communications affected sentencing)
Card v. State, 652 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1995) (relief where judge lacked input in drafting sentencing order)
Bolin v. State, 184 So. 3d 492 (Fla. 2015) (Malone’s limited role in other cases may not create Brady materiality)
Rhodes v. State, 986 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 2008) (postconviction revelations about forensic testimony not necessarily Brady material)
Bogle v. State, 213 So. 3d 833 (Fla.) (evidence of other acts or misconduct inadmissible to show propensity)