Erineo Cano v. Nicole Taylor
739 F.3d 1214
9th Cir.2014Background
- Cano, an Arizona prison inmate, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging (I) Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to mental-health needs, (II) First Amendment free exercise claim (no kosher food), and (III) denial of access to courts (removal of a self-help litigation manual).
- Cano filed an initial complaint (Dec. 2007) and a First Amended Complaint (May 2008) that added counts II and III. The administrative grievances relevant to counts II and III were filed after the initial complaint but before the FAC.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on count I and denied appointment of counsel; it dismissed counts II and III without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, relying on the date of the initial complaint.
- On appeal, Cano was released from custody; defendants argued injunctive/declaratory relief claims were moot but damages claims survived.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on count I and the denial of counsel, vacated dismissal of counts II and III, and remanded to allow the district court to determine whether Cano properly and timely exhausted administrative remedies prior to the FAC filing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference (Count I) | Cano contends mental-health care and medication decisions amounted to deliberate indifference causing suicidal crises. | Defendants say they provided regular, extensive mental-health care and monitored Cano’s statements and refusals; his complaints reflect disagreement, manipulation, and noncompliance. | Affirmed for defendants: record shows frequent treatment and documentation; no reasonable factfinder could find deliberate indifference. |
| Denial of appointed counsel | Cano argued he needed counsel given complexity and to assist with likelihood of success. | Defendants and district court: no exceptional circumstances; Cano could articulate claims and was unlikely to succeed. | Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion under Palmer factors. |
| PLRA exhaustion for counts II & III (added in FAC) | Cano argues administrative remedies were exhausted before filing the FAC, so those claims are properly added. | Defendants argued claims not exhausted before the initial complaint, so barred under §1997e(a). | Vacated and remanded: under Rhodes/Akhtar line, exhaustion is measured against the filing date of the amended complaint; district court must decide whether Cano properly exhausted per prison procedures. |
| Mootness of injunctive/declaratory relief | Cano sought injunctive/declaratory relief plus damages. | Defendants: release moots injunctive/declaratory claims. | Partially affirmed: injunctive/declaratory claims moot upon release, but damages claims survive. |
Key Cases Cited
- McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2004) (damages claims survive prisoner’s release)
- Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2005) (prisoner damages claims survive release; exhaustion principles)
- Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2012) (exhaustion must occur before filing amended complaint adding new claims)
- McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002) (PLRA requires exhaustion before suit; exhaustion is a precondition)
- Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2010) (amended complaint supersedes original; exhaustion measured at time of amendment)
- Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (proper exhaustion requires compliance with an agency’s procedural rules)
- Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2013) (PLRA’s purpose to deter frivolous prisoner suits while preserving meritorious claims)
- Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2009) (standard for appointment of counsel in civil cases)