Erik Jonathan Carrasco v. State, 02-17-00142-CR

On May 14, 2016, officers stopped Erik Carrasco after a 911 caller reported a pickup truck weaving, nearly causing multiple collisions, running a red light, and nearly striking pedestrians.
Officers observed bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, unsteady balance, an odor from the truck, and Carrasco refused field sobriety and voluntary blood/breath tests.
A warrant-authorized blood draw tested positive for methamphetamine (183 ng/mL), the illegal form; the prosecution presented fingerprint evidence of a 2003 prior DWI conviction.
The information included an “Enhancement Paragraph” alleging one prior DWI; the jury was instructed that the prior conviction was an element of the charged Class A misdemeanor.
The jury found Carrasco guilty of DWI — misdemeanor repetition; he pleaded guilty to punishment (190 days jail). On appeal, he raised three points: (1) error in reading the enhancement paragraph at guilt-innocence stage; (2) insufficiency of evidence to prove intoxication from methamphetamine; and (3) facial unconstitutionality of article 102.0185(a) (the $100 emergency-services court cost).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Carrasco)	Held
Whether the alleged prior DWI had to be withheld from jury until punishment	The prior DWI is an element of the Class A DWI offense under §49.09(a); therefore the State could read it at the guilt-innocence stage	The enhancement paragraph label makes the prior conviction a punishment enhancement and thus it should not be read until punishment	Court held the prior DWI is an element of the offense, so reading the paragraph before guilt-innocence was permissible.
Whether evidence was sufficient to prove intoxication by methamphetamine	Circumstantial evidence (erratic driving, officer observations, odor, refusal to test, methamphetamine in blood) permitted jury to infer intoxication by controlled substance without expert testimony	Argued State needed expert proof that the concentration found (183 ng/mL) would cause loss of normal faculties	Court held evidence was sufficient; expert testimony on concentration effects was not required.
Whether article 102.0185(a) emergency-services fee as court costs is facially unconstitutional	State conceded error in light of Casas and related authority that the fee is not a true court cost	Carrasco argued fee is facially unconstitutional as a court cost	Court sustained this point, deleted the $100 emergency-services fee from assessed costs and modified judgment.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (legal sufficiency standard) (establishes the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt sufficiency review)
Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. Crim. App.) (defining "element")
Gibson v. State, 995 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Crim. App.) (prior intoxication offense can elevate DWI classification)
Cotton v. State, 686 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Crim. App.) (circumstantial evidence of intoxication; factors officers may rely on)
Paschall v. State, 285 S.W.3d 166 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth) (permitting jury to infer intoxication from circumstantial evidence including controlled-substance detection)
Casas v. State, 524 S.W.3d 921 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth) (holding article 102.0185 emergency-services fee not a proper court cost)
Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. Crim. App.) (remedy: reform judgment to remove improperly assessed costs)