Erie Indemnity Company, as the Attorney-In-Fact for the Subscribers at Erie Insurance Exchange v. The Estate of Brian L. Harris, By Its Special Representative, Laura Harris, 80 N.E.3d 923

Background

Brian L. Harris, a long‑time employee of Formco, was killed on Aug. 6, 2010 when an uninsured driver (Sparks) struck him while he was on a riding lawnmower at home. Sparks borrowed the vehicle from the Stouders; their insurance did not apply because Sparks was an unlicensed driver.
Formco held a commercial auto policy issued by Erie (renewed annually); the policy listed Formco as the Named Insured, scheduled multiple vehicles (including Brian’s 2004 Toyota), and listed three drivers (including Brian) on the original application. Brian was not a named insured and paid no premium.
The policy included an Indiana Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist (UM) Endorsement with $1,000,000 limits. The UM Endorsement used the phrase “others we protect” in its grant of coverage but did not bold or explicitly define that precise phrase in the Definitions section.
Erie denied the Estate’s UM claim, arguing Brian was not a named insured and was not occupying an insured auto at the time of the accident. The Estate sued for declaratory judgment and damages; cross‑motions for summary judgment followed.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the Estate, holding the UM Endorsement covered Brian (and thus the Estate) despite him being outside a scheduled vehicle. Erie appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the phrase “others we protect” in the UM Endorsement is ambiguous and includes Brian	Term is not bolded/defined; reasonable to read it as not a defined term and thus susceptible to coverage for Brian as someone the policy intended to protect	Term should be read in context: the immediately following “OTHERS WE PROTECT” paragraph limits who qualifies and excludes Brian/the Estate	Phrase is ambiguous; construed against insurer, Brian is within “others we protect”
Whether a non‑named employee (Brian) may recover UM benefits while outside a scheduled vehicle (pedestrian status)	The policy’s express pedestrian exclusion (for vehicles owned by “you”/a relative) implies generally pedestrian coverage otherwise; Brian was struck by a vehicle not owned by Formco, so coverage applies	Erie contends UM applies only when occupying an insured auto and excludes coverage here	Court held the Endorsement covers Brian as a pedestrian except where the uninsured vehicle is owned by the Named Insured or relative; here Formco did not own Sparks’ vehicle, so coverage applies
Whether ambiguities must be construed neutrally because claimant is not a contracting party	Erie: as a third‑party claimant, ambiguities should be read neutrally	Estate: Brian was not a stranger to the policy (longtime employee, listed as a scheduled driver), so ambiguity should be resolved against insurer	Court rejected neutral construction, finding Brian was within the intended insured class and thus ambiguities are resolved against Erie
Whether summary judgment was appropriate on coverage	Estate: no genuine issue of material fact; policy ambiguity and language support coverage as a matter of law	Erie: factual/interpretive disputes and policy language preclude summary judgment for Estate	Court affirmed summary judgment for the Estate: no genuine factual dispute and law supports coverage

Key Cases Cited

Bradshaw v. Chandler, 916 N.E.2d 163 (Ind. 2009) (insurance‑policy interpretation seeks parties’ intent; ordinary meaning controls)
FLM, LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 973 N.E.2d 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (standard of review for summary judgment appeals)
Buckeye State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carfield, 914 N.E.2d 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (policy must be construed as a whole)
Masten v. AMCO Ins. Co., 953 N.E.2d 566 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (endorsements read with policy to give effect to the whole)
Milbank Ins. Co. v. Indiana Ins. Co., 56 N.E.3d 1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (ambiguities in insurance contracts construed strictly against insurer)
Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Beatty, 870 N.E.2d 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (UM coverage required unless valid written rejection)
Tate v. Secura Ins., 587 N.E.2d 665 (Ind. 1992) (plain and ordinary meaning applied to clear policy language)
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 482 N.E.2d 467 (Ind. 1985) (ambiguity exists where reasonable persons would differ on meaning)
Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Jones, 953 N.E.2d 608 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (distinguishing when neutral construction applies based on claimant’s relation to policyholders)
Empire Fire v. Frierson, 49 N.E.3d 1075 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (treating third‑party claimant ambiguity analysis)