Erickson v. Canyons School District
2020 UT App 91
| Utah Ct. App. | 2020Background
- At a high-school assembly a student retrieved a confiscated homemade flag on a pole, climbed bleachers, and threw the flagpole into the crowd, striking Juel Erickson in the head and knocking her unconscious; she later suffered neck injuries and post‑concussive symptoms. No school employee summoned an ambulance or provided medical care.
- Erickson sued the School District (among others) for negligence, gross negligence, and vicarious liability for failing to secure the flagpole, supervise students, and provide medical assistance.
- The School District moved to dismiss under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing sovereign immunity under the Governmental Immunity Act because Erickson’s injuries arose from a battery (an intentional tort), which preserves immunity.
- Erickson responded that her complaint is silent on Student’s intent and that a reasonable inference exists that Student intended to throw the flagpole to friends (like throwing a football), which—if true—would not constitute battery; intent is a subjective, fact‑intensive inquiry.
- The district court denied dismissal as premature; the School District sought interlocutory review. The Court of Appeals reviewed whether Erickson could plausibly prove facts showing no battery (and thus no immunity).
- The court held that at the complaint stage reasonable inferences could support a non‑battery scenario: substantial certainty (not mere likelihood or recklessness) is required for battery intent, so dismissal was improper; affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Erickson’s complaint necessarily alleges a battery (triggering immunity) so as to require dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) | Erickson: complaint is silent on Student’s intent; reasonable inference exists that Student intended to throw the pole to friends (non‑battery); intent is fact‑specific and premature to decide now | School District: Student knew it was substantially likely the pole would hit someone; that suffices to treat the act as intentional and preserve immunity | Court: Reversed dismissal — intent is subjective and fact‑intensive; substantial certainty (higher than likelihood/recklessness) is required for battery; reasonable non‑battery inferences exist, so denial of 12(b)(6) motion affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Wagner v. State, 122 P.3d 599 (Utah 2005) (adopts Restatement elements of battery; intent requires desire or substantial certainty)
- Sanders v. Leavitt, 37 P.3d 1052 (Utah 2001) (intentional torts such as assault/battery preserve governmental immunity)
- Torgerson v. Talbot, 414 P.3d 504 (Utah Ct. App. 2017) (Rule 12(b)(6) review: accept complaint facts and reasonable inferences)
- America West Bank Members, LC v. State, 342 P.3d 224 (Utah 2014) (dismissal proper only if plaintiff cannot recover under any facts it could prove)
- Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 179 P.3d 786 (Utah 2008) (summary judgment improper when inferences depend on subjective intent)
- Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, LLC, 221 P.3d 256 (Utah 2009) (recklessness standard involves knowledge of a high degree of risk, distinct from substantial certainty)