315 P.3d 798
Idaho2013Background
- Hall, convicted and sentenced to death twice, seeks post-conviction relief from Hall II (Cheryl Hanlon murder) while Hall I post-conviction proceedings were ongoing.
- Communications between Hall II trial counsels and SAPD post-conviction counsel raised potential conflict of interest.
- District court appointed independent conflict counsel Roark to investigate conflicts and ordered SAPD to pay Roark’s fees.
- Ex Parte Notice from SAPD disclosed sharing testing and expert information with Hall II trial counsel.
- Court held Hall has statutory right to conflict-free counsel under I.C.R. 44.2(1) and vacated the district court’s Roark appointment and related financial orders.
- Court rejected use of I.C. § 19-871 and § 19-860(2) to shift Roark’s fees to SAPD or Ada County and found privilege issues with Roark’s access to SAPD files.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether death-sentence petitioners have a right to conflict-free counsel, statutorily. | Hall asserts I.C.R. 44.2(1) grants conflict-free counsel. | State contends the right is statutory, not constitutional, and requires such appointment. | Yes, statutory right to conflict-free counsel exists under I.C.R. 44.2(1). |
| Whether the district court erred by appointing Roark to conduct the conflict inquiry. | Roark was unnecessary given Benjamin’s prior inquiry; Ex Parte Notice was insufficient to trigger inquiry. | Court had duty to conduct thorough conflict inquiry given potential conflicts. | Yes, district court erred; Roark's appointment and inquiry must be vacated. |
| Whether SAPD should pay for Roark’s services under I.C. § 19-871. | SAPD payment imposed due to SAPD’s conduct and alleged conflict. | Statute only applies when SAPD is unable to carry out duties due to conflict; no conflict found. | Vacate; SAPD not obligated to pay Roark’s fees. |
| Whether Ada County or I.C. § 19-860(2) makes Ada County responsible for Roark’s costs. | Ada County liable under § 19-860(2) because attorney was not SAPD. | § 19-860(2) applies only on formal charges; not here. | Not applicable; Ada County not responsible. |
| Whether Roark’s access to SAPD files violated attorney-client privilege. | Order allowed broad access, breaching privilege. | Access necessary for conflict inquiry. | Yes, order violated attorney-client privilege; Roark’s access improperly broad. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (U.S. 1981) (right to conflict-free counsel under Sixth Amendment)
- State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53 (Idaho 2003) (duty to inquire into conflicts when a conflict may exist)
- State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694 (Idaho 2009) (thorough, on-the-record conflict inquiry; aiding standard)
- Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (U.S. 2002) (conflict inquiry triggered by known conflict, not vague possibility)
- Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (U.S. 1980) (co-defendant conflict scenarios; due process safeguards)
- Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685 (Idaho 1995) (statutory right to counsel in appeals and to effective assistance relied on Sixth Amendment framework)
- Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822 (Idaho 2009) (statutory right to counsel in certain civil/post-conviction contexts; applies Sixth Amendment standards for effectiveness)
- Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1967) (guidance on evaluating conflicts and reliance on counsel representations)
- Knix v. State, 922 P.2d 913 (Alaska 1996) (substantial necessity justifies intrusions on privilege)
- Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (U.S. 1978) (court must protect right to counsel in trials)
