Eric Tapley v. Andrew Chambers
840 F.3d 370
| 7th Cir. | 2016Background
- Tapley, with co-plaintiffs Hosea and Pugh, litigated related § 1983 and state claims arising from incidents in 2011–2012 in two district-court matters: 12-cv-1339 (2012) and 15-cv-1051 (2015).
- Plaintiffs appealed both; however, the appellate record included only the 2015 case materials—no record from the 2012 case was provided to the Seventh Circuit.
- The 2015 case involves a September 15, 2011 traffic stop: officers followed Tapley from a Price Rite parking lot after observing loud music and alleged speeding, stopped him, and a K9/free-air sniff was proposed; a physical confrontation led to arrest for obstruction and resisting arrest; Tapley was later acquitted of obstruction at trial.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the officers in the 2015 case, concluding there was probable cause to stop Tapley; that judgment was appealed and is the only one the Seventh Circuit reviewed on the merits.
- The Seventh Circuit dismissed the attempted appeal of the 2012 case for lack of record, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the 2015 case because officers had probable cause to stop Tapley for speeding, rendering the Fourth Amendment claim unsuccessful.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court may review the 2012 case on appeal despite absence of its record | Tapley asked the court to review the 2012 judgment as part of his appeal | Defendants argued the appeal of 2012 must be dismissed because the record from that case was not provided | Dismissed the 2012 appeal for lack of record; appellant failed to supply required transcript/record and did not move to correct the record |
| Whether the traffic stop was supported by probable cause (loud music vs speeding) | Tapley contested the officers’ factual basis (e.g., whether music was audible at 75 feet) and disputed other facts supporting probable cause | Officers showed evidence (observer testimony, difficulty following, engine revving, need to exceed speed limit to catch up) that provided probable cause to stop for speeding | There was probable cause to stop for speeding; even if loud-music probable cause was disputed, the stop was lawful because speeding provided an objectively reasonable basis |
| Whether officers’ subjective/multiple motives (pretext) invalidate the stop/arrest | Tapley argued officers’ true motives (e.g., to conduct K9 sniff or detain) undermine reasonableness | Officers contended that objective probable cause governs, regardless of subjective motives | Court held subjective intent is irrelevant; a stop is lawful if officers had probable cause for any traffic violation (pretext permissible) |
| Whether arrest for obstruction/resisting could support Fourth Amendment claim despite probable cause for a traffic offense | Tapley argued the arrest lacked probable cause for obstruction/resisting and that those arrests made the seizure unreasonable | Officers argued probable cause for speeding justified the seizure and any subsequent arrest was constitutionally permissible if any probable cause existed | Because probable cause existed for speeding, the Fourth Amendment claim failed; probable cause to believe any crime was committed defeats a false-arrest/illegal-seizure claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Larkin v. Galloway, 266 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2001) (dismissal without prejudice typically not final for appealability)
- Stookey v. Teller Training Distribs., Inc., 9 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 1993) (appellate review requires an adequate record; dismissal appropriate if record deficient)
- LaFollette v. Savage, 63 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 1995) (appellate rule authority to correct or require forwarding of missing district-court record)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1996) (objective probable cause for traffic violation makes stop reasonable regardless of officer’s subjective intent)
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (U.S. 2004) (probable cause for any offense will preclude a false-arrest claim even if arrest made for different offense)
- Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (U.S. 2001) (arrest for even minor offenses is constitutionally permissible when probable cause exists)