Eric Spencer v. Schmidt Electric Company
576 F. App'x 442
5th Cir.2014Background
- Schmidt Electric subcontracted on an M.D. Anderson construction site; employees (including Spencer and Bellard) were union-represented under a collective bargaining agreement. Both employees had acknowledged Schmidt’s written anti-harassment and safety policies.
- Spencer (Black apprentice) alleged repeated racist comments and harassment by foremen Jean Machen and David Vidrine, including a forwarded text showing Ku Klux Klan imagery; Spencer told his union steward but did not report directly to Schmidt management; he quit on December 28, 2010. Schmidt investigated, offered Spencer his job back, and fired Machen and Vidrine in early January.
- Bellard (Black journeyman) attended ladder-safety trainings implementing a zero-tolerance rule. After a ladder violation on January 17, 2011, Vaughn (general contractor) demanded Bellard’s removal; Schmidt terminated Bellard on January 18, 2011.
- Plaintiffs sued Schmidt in Texas state court raising Title VII and Texas Labor Code claims; case was removed to federal court. The district court granted summary judgment for Schmidt on all claims; Spencer appealed hostile work environment and retaliation denials; Bellard appealed denial of racial-discrimination claim.
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Schmidt on Spencer’s hostile-work-environment and retaliation claims and on Bellard’s discrimination claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether foremen were "supervisors" for vicarious liability in hostile-work-environment | Spencer: foremen directed his work and exercised authority on site, so employer vicariously liable | Schmidt: foremen lacked power to take tangible employment actions (hire/fire) under Vance; thus employer liability requires proof it knew and failed to act | Foremen were not supervisors under Vance; Spencer failed to show Schmidt knew or should have known and failed to act — summary judgment affirmed |
| Whether Spencer’s quitting and other conduct amounted to constructive discharge or defeated employer’s Ellerth/Faragher defense | Spencer: working conditions rose to intolerable level; employer should be liable | Schmidt: prompt corrective measures existed (policy, investigation, firing of harassers, reemployment offers); Spencer didn’t use internal avenues | Court found no evidence Spencer was constructively discharged for hostile-environment claim and he failed to exploit company’s corrective procedures; employer defense stands |
| Whether Spencer stated a retaliation claim based on being cursed at and being cornered after complaining to union | Spencer: protected activity (reported to union); being cornered and questioned by the sender and another foreman was materially adverse and causally connected | Schmidt: foremen’s conduct not attributable to employer (not agents with authority); curses and minor slights are not materially adverse | Court held curses were petty slights; even if cornering could be severe, foremen’s actions were not attributable to Schmidt as agents — summary judgment affirmed (concurring judge would reverse on retaliation) |
| Whether Bellard proved disparate treatment for race discrimination after termination for safety violation | Bellard: other white employees received lesser discipline for similar safety infractions | Schmidt: termination was nondiscriminatory — zero-tolerance policy, Vaughn demanded removal, Bellard’s disrespectful comments to safety officer justified termination | Bellard failed to identify nearly identical comparators or rebut Schmidt’s nondiscriminatory reasons; summary judgment for Schmidt affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644 (5th Cir. 2012) (elements of hostile work environment claim)
- Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (U.S. 2013) (employee is a supervisor only if empowered to take tangible employment actions)
- Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (employer affirmative defense to supervisor harassment)
- Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (same employer defense principles)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (standard for materially adverse retaliatory action)
- Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (U.S. 2013) (but-for causation standard for retaliation)
- McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2007) (prima facie elements in Title VII discrimination)