Eric Norris v. Marilyn Brooks
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12939
| 3rd Cir. | 2015Background
- Eric Norris was convicted in Pennsylvania state court (trial Aug 2001) and sentenced under the state "three strikes" law to 25–50 years.
- Post-trial counsel raised ineffective-assistance claims; the trial court rejected them. Norris later filed a PCRA petition asserting, among other things, that trial counsel ineffectively failed to seek dismissal on speedy-trial grounds; the trial court dismissed that claim as meritless.
- PCRA counsel J. Matthew Wolfe abandoned the speedy-trial argument on appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court over Norris’s objections; the Superior Court held the issue waived on appeal and denied relief. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review.
- Norris filed a federal habeas petition in 2007 raising only the ineffective-assistance (speedy-trial) claim; the District Court denied it as procedurally defaulted. In 2012, after Martinez v. Ryan, Norris moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to reopen, arguing Martinez excused the procedural default.
- The District Court denied the Rule 60(b) motion for three reasons: Martinez did not apply (claim was abandoned on collateral appeal, not initial collateral review), Martinez alone was not an "extraordinary circumstance" for Rule 60(b)(6), and the motion was a second/successive habeas petition. The Third Circuit granted a COA on the Martinez issue and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Martinez v. Ryan applies to excuse procedural default where counsel abandoned the claim on collateral appeal (not initial PCRA review) | Norris: Martinez excuses his default because PCRA counsel’s deficiencies caused the claim to go unreviewed in state court | Commonwealth/District Court: Martinez’s exception applies only to errors in initial-review collateral proceedings, not appellate abandonment | Held: Martinez does not apply; Norris’s waiver occurred on collateral appeal, so Coleman remains controlling |
| Whether alleged inadequate presentation of the claim in initial PCRA proceedings (poor advocacy vs procedural default) qualifies under Martinez | Norris: Wolfe inadequately presented the claim at initial PCRA, so the default stems from initial-review counsel’s errors | Commonwealth: Poor advocacy is not the same as a procedural default caused at initial review; district court’s factual finding that waiver occurred on appeal is binding on Rule 60(b) review | Held: Court rejects conflating poor advocacy with Martinez-type procedural default and accepts district court’s prior finding |
| Whether counsel’s conduct amounted to abandonment (Maples/Holland) excusing the procedural default | Norris: Wolfe effectively abandoned him by ignoring his instructions and failing to pursue the speedy-trial claim on appeal | Commonwealth: Norris raised this late (reply brief) and Wolfe’s conduct falls short of the abandonment doctrine’s high bar | Held: Rejected — factual allegations do not meet Maples/Holland abandonment standard |
| Whether Martinez alone constitutes extraordinary circumstances for Rule 60(b)(6) relief | Norris: Martinez is an intervening, controlling Supreme Court decision that warrants reopening the habeas denial | Commonwealth/District Court: A change in law rarely suffices for Rule 60(b)(6); Martinez must be both applicable and supported by equitable factors | Held: Even if Martinez could support relief in some circumstances, it is inapplicable here, so Rule 60(b)(6) relief is not warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (narrow exception excusing procedural default for ineffective-assistance claims caused by attorney error in initial-review collateral proceedings)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (attorney error in postconviction proceedings generally does not constitute cause to excuse procedural default)
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (distinguishing Rule 60(b) motions from second or successive habeas petitions)
- Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012) (attorney abandonment can excuse procedural default when attorney abandons client without notice)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) (Martinez may apply where state procedural framework makes it unlikely that ineffective-assistance claims can be raised on direct appeal)
- Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2014) (Martinez alone ordinarily does not entitle a habeas petitioner to Rule 60(b)(6) relief; applicability plus equities may be required)