182 A.3d 737
Me.2018Background
- Parents Fitzpatrick and McCrary litigated custody of a child born 2013; Maine District Court initially awarded primary residence to McCrary, then in Jan 2016 changed primary residence to Fitzpatrick by agreement.
- McCrary filed a contempt motion (Apr 2016) and, before service, Fitzpatrick filed a custody-confirmation action in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania (Apr 2016); Pennsylvania entered an August 2016 interim order asserting jurisdiction.
- McCrary filed a Maine motion to modify custody (June 24, 2016). After service, Fitzpatrick moved to dismiss in Maine claiming Pennsylvania had assumed exclusive jurisdiction; his filings contained factual assertions but no affidavits.
- The Maine District Court denied dismissal and later (Feb 21, 2017) granted McCrary’s motion to modify, awarding her primary residence; Fitzpatrick failed to appear at the modification hearing.
- Maine and Pennsylvania judges later conferred; Pennsylvania formally relinquished jurisdiction to Maine (Mar 2017). Fitzpatrick moved for Rule 60(b)(4) relief claiming the Maine judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction; the court denied relief and this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Maine lost jurisdiction after Pennsylvania purported to assume jurisdiction | Fitzpatrick: Pennsylvania’s interim order implicitly divested Maine of jurisdiction under 19-A M.R.S. § 1746(1)(B) because McCrary and child had moved | McCrary: Pennsylvania never made a finding McCrary left Maine; Maine retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction | Court: No. Pennsylvania’s interim order did not establish McCrary’s nonresidence; no competent evidence supports such a finding; Maine retained jurisdiction |
| Whether a Rule 60(b)(4) void-judgment claim applies where jurisdiction was retained by Maine | Fitzpatrick: Judgment void because Maine lacked subject-matter jurisdiction when it decided modification | McCrary: Maine had continuing jurisdiction so judgment was not void | Court: Rule 60(b)(4) relief not required; judgment not void because statutory prerequisites for Maine’s continuing jurisdiction were met |
| Whether the Maine court erred under 19-A M.R.S. § 1740 by communicating with Pennsylvania without letting parties participate | Fitzpatrick: He was entitled to present facts and legal arguments before a jurisdiction decision | McCrary: Court acted within its discretion under § 1740 and parties had earlier opportunities to be heard | Court: No error; § 1740 permits (but does not require) court-to-court communication and permitting party participation is discretionary; no abuse of discretion |
| Whether the trial court abused discretion by denying additional opportunity to litigate jurisdiction after court-to-court communication | Fitzpatrick: He should have been given another chance to present evidence/arguments | McCrary: He already submitted arguments twice; additional opportunity unnecessary | Court: No abuse; trial court reasonably declined a third opportunity given prior submissions and discretionary use of § 1740 |
Key Cases Cited
- Reliable Copy Serv., Inc. v. Liberty, 32 A.3d 1041 (Me. 2011) (standard for review of Rule 60(b) rulings and void-judgment principle)
- Cole v. Cushman, 946 A.2d 430 (Me. 2008) (construction of UCCJEA and interaction with PKPA)
- Barclay v. Eckert, 743 A.2d 1259 (Me. 2000) (PKPA preemption and custody jurisdiction principles)
- Town of Wiscasset v. Mason Station, LLC, 116 A.3d 458 (Me. 2015) (abuse-of-discretion review for non-jurisdictional trial-court conduct)
- Collins v. State, 213 A.2d 835 (Me. 1965) (interpretation of statutory permissive term "may")
- Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230 (2001) (statutory interpretation of "may" vs "must")