Eric Mann v. Charles Ryan
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13022
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- In 1989 Eric Mann lured two men with a fake cocaine sale, took their money, and shot them; he was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in Arizona state court.
- At trial Mann’s counsel, David Sherman, pursued a self-defense theory, did not call defense witnesses, and Mann did not testify; Sherman later sought a psychological evaluation before sentencing.
- Mitigation at sentencing included testimony from family and a court-appointed psychologist diagnosing substance abuse and antisocial personality disorder; the trial judge found several statutory aggravators and sentenced Mann to death.
- Post-conviction, Mann presented new expert reports and testimony alleging a 1985 automobile accident caused traumatic brain injury that could have been mitigating; the same judge who presided at trial denied relief, finding no causal link and no prejudice.
- Mann sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254, claiming ineffective assistance at trial and sentencing and arguing the state court misapplied Strickland and other Supreme Court precedents; the Ninth Circuit affirmed denial under AEDPA deference.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial-phase IAC: counsel discouraged Mann from testifying | Mann: Sherman wrongly advised him not to testify and breached an implicit promise to the jury | State: Sherman reasonably discouraged perjury and made no promise; strategic choice | Denied — state credibility findings upheld; no Strickland violation for discouraging perjury or for opening-statement strategy |
| Opening-statement promise | Mann: Sherman promised Mann’s testimony and then failed to produce it, prejudicing defense | State: Opening statement did not promise testimony; evidence later elicited supported defense theory | Denied — no promise was made and strategy was permissible |
| Sentencing-phase IAC: failure to investigate/present mitigation (1985 accident/TBI) | Mann: counsel failed to investigate medical records and brain injury evidence, which likely would have changed sentencing | State: Post-conviction court found the new evidence cumulative/unpersuasive and no causal link to the murders, so no prejudice | Denied — court applied Strickland-compatible analysis or at least a permissible reading; not an unreasonable application under AEDPA |
| Standard-of-review/AEDPA applicability | Mann: state court applied wrong prejudice standard (more-likely-than-not) and excluded mitigation via causal-nexus rule — so federal court should review de novo | State: The post-conviction opinion is reasonably read as applying Strickland’s "reasonable probability" standard and properly weighed mitigation; AEDPA deference applies | Denied — majority reads state decision as consistent with Supreme Court precedent; AEDPA deference bars de novo review; concurrence disagrees and would grant relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (defining ineffective-assistance standard and "reasonable probability" prejudice test)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (AEDPA requires relief only if no fairminded jurist could find state decision consistent with Supreme Court precedent)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (clarifying AEDPA "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" standards)
- Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (sentencer must consider all relevant mitigating evidence)
- Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (prohibits excluding mitigating evidence for lack of causal nexus)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (jury must find aggravating factors; sentencing-by-judge for death penalty unconstitutional)