302 So.3d 734
Fla.2020Background
- Eric Kurt Patrick was convicted of kidnapping, robbery, and first‑degree murder and sentenced to death; this Court affirmed on direct appeal and later granted habeas relief on Hurst claims, ordering a new penalty phase.
- During voir dire, a juror said he would be biased against anyone he "felt . . . was a homosexual," believing such a person "might lie, might steal, might kill," and acknowledged this bias could affect deliberations.
- Patrick’s guilt‑phase defense relied on a theory the victim preyed on Patrick and that Patrick reacted in a rage to unwanted sexual advances; Patrick’s police statement (played at trial) repeatedly distanced him from being gay.
- On remand this claim—ineffective assistance for failure to strike a biased juror—was heard; lead defense counsel George Reres testified he intentionally kept the juror for strategic reasons (believing the juror could favor the defense on guilt and oppose death in the penalty phase).
- The postconviction court found Reres’s testimony credible and that seating the juror was a reasonable strategy; it denied relief. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed, holding the finding was supported by competent, substantial evidence and the strategy was objectively reasonable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge a juror who expressed anti‑homosexual bias | Patrick: counsel performed deficiently by not striking a juror actually biased against him, satisfying Strickland prejudice under Carratelli | State/Reres: trial counsel strategically kept the juror because the juror could favor guilt‑phase theory and was favorable on penalty | Court: Not ineffective; postconviction court’s strategic‑decision finding supported by competent, substantial evidence and strategy was objectively reasonable |
| Whether juror’s statements satisfied Strickland prejudice (Carratelli standard) | Patrick: juror’s voir dire admissions show actual bias and thus prejudice as a matter of record | State: accepts juror was biased but argues prejudice does not end inquiry because counsel’s strategy can nonetheless be reasonable | Court: Juror was actually biased (Carratelli met) but prejudice alone does not establish deficient performance; Strickland requires both prongs |
| Whether the postconviction court’s factual finding of strategy is reviewable and supported | Patrick: challenges credibility/weight of Reres’s testimony and argues strategy was unreasonable | State: testimony, counsel notes, and client involvement support the strategic choice | Court: Review for competent, substantial evidence; affirmed the postconviction court’s credibility finding and refusal to reweigh evidence |
| Whether counsel’s strategy (keeping an arguably biased juror) was objectively unreasonable | Patrick: seating a juror with admitted bias was per se unreasonable here | State: in capital cases counsel may prioritize penalty‑phase juror composition and reasonable to accept some guilt‑phase tradeoffs | Court: Strategy objectively reasonable under the circumstances; not deficient performance |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2007) (prejudice established if an actually biased juror sat on the jury)
- Patrick v. State, 104 So. 3d 1046 (Fla. 2012) (direct appeal setting out facts)
- Patrick v. State, 246 So. 3d 253 (Fla. 2018) (remanding summary‑denied juror‑bias claim for evidentiary hearing)
- Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1995) (recognizing counsel may keep jurors unfavorable on guilt but favorable on penalty as reasonable strategy)
- Bolin v. State, 41 So. 3d 151 (Fla. 2010) (standards for review after an evidentiary hearing)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (U.S. 2011) (deference to counsel’s strategic decisions)
- Monlyn v. State, 894 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 2004) (attorney’s standard practice can support testimony about trial strategy)
- Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 2001) (appellate court will not reweigh credibility findings of the postconviction court)
- Provenzano v. Singletary, 148 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 1998) (greater deference to experienced counsel)