Eric Johnson v. City of South Bend
680 F. App'x 475
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- In July 2014 Eric Johnson (pro se) sued the City of South Bend and individual police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged unlawful entries, searches, theft, property damage, and a wrongful arrest that occurred in early 2004.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) arguing the claims were time-barred by Indiana’s 2-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims.
- Johnson filed a “Motion for Statutory Exception” and asserted he received daily treatment for bipolar disorder and heroin addiction from Oct. 2004 to Sept. 2013 and invoked equitable tolling/mental incapacity as a basis to excuse the delay.
- The district court dismissed the suit, reasoning the claims accrued in 2004, finding no adequate proof of civil commitment or inpatient treatment, and denied Johnson’s reconsideration; it treated the timeliness defense without converting the motion to summary judgment.
- On appeal the Seventh Circuit found the district court erred: the limitations defense is an affirmative defense that may require evidence, the district court’s notice to the pro se plaintiff was inadequate under precedent, and Johnson was not given a fair opportunity to present admissible evidence of incapacity for tolling.
- The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings so Johnson can be given a proper opportunity to oppose the limitations defense with admissible evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether equitable tolling for mental incapacity avoids the statute of limitations | Johnson: his long-term mental illness/addiction and treatment at Edgewater tolled the limitations until 2013 | Defendants: no evidence of civil commitment, inpatient care, or incapacity during the limitations period; statute still bars suit | Court: equitable tolling may apply; dismissal premature without permitting evidence and adequate notice to pro se plaintiff |
| Whether Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal was proper on statute-of-limitations grounds | Johnson: alleged tolling in complaint and motion; factual allegations should be accepted | Defendants: limitations clear; Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal appropriate | Court: statute of limitations is an affirmative defense; Rule 12 dismissal improper when resolution requires evidence; conversion to summary judgment required but did not occur |
| Adequacy of district court’s notice to pro se plaintiff when dismissal depends on evidence | Johnson: was not warned he needed admissible evidence to oppose timeliness dismissal | Defendants: notice sufficient; Johnson bore burden to prove tolling | Court: notice was inadequate per Timms/Lewis/Bryant/Kinkaid; pro se must be told he cannot rest on pleadings and must submit admissible evidence |
| Whether district court properly denied reconsideration after Johnson clarified tolling argument | Johnson: clarified he was incapacitated and sought equitable tolling; asked reconsideration | Defendants: no new evidence of incapacity was presented | Court: denial was error because plaintiff lacked fair opportunity to present evidence; remand required |
Key Cases Cited
- Behavioral Inst. of Ind., LLC v. Hobart City of Common Council, 406 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2005) (Indiana statute of limitations governs § 1983 claims)
- Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2012) (state tolling rules apply to § 1983 actions)
- Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1992) (requirements for notifying pro se plaintiffs when summary-judgment evidence is necessary)
- Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1982) (pro se notice standards when converting motions to summary judgment)
- Bryant v. Madigan, 91 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 1996) (pro se litigant must be warned that he cannot rest on pleadings when summary judgment evidence is required)
- Kinkaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1992) (adequate notice requirements before treating a motion as one for summary judgment)
- Jones v. Simek, 193 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 1999) (procedural protections for pro se plaintiffs facing dismissal on evidentiary grounds)
- City of Fort Wayne v. Cameron, 370 N.E.2d 338 (Ind. 1977) (recognition of equitable tolling for mental incapacity under Indiana law)
