Eric G. Hanisko v. Billy Casper Golf Management, Inc., 437 N.J. Super. 349

Background

Hanisko was hired in March 2008 as superintendent of Cranbury Golf Club (CGC) pursuant to a written offer (sent on CGC letterhead and bearing BCGM logo); housing on the club property was included as an employment benefit.
He lived in employer-provided manager’s quarters on the club property, was effectively on-call, and paid no rent or utilities (except cable).
On April 11, 2009 he slipped on a wooden step in his residence and fractured his ankle.
Hanisko filed a Superior Court negligence suit against Billy Casper Golf Management, Inc. (BCGM) and CGC; he later filed a separate workers’ compensation claim against BCGM.
Defendants moved for summary judgment in Superior Court invoking the Workers’ Compensation Act exclusivity bar (special/joint employer theories); the court considered the executed offer letter (produced after discovery) and granted summary judgment, transferring the matter to the Division of Workers’ Compensation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are defendants judicially estopped from asserting the workers’ compensation exclusivity defense?	Defendants successfully took an inconsistent position in the workers’ compensation forum and should be estopped from asserting exclusivity in Superior Court.	No prior court accepted defendants’ inconsistent position; the workers’ comp claim settled without adjudication, so estoppel doesn’t apply.	No estoppel — doctrine requires a prior court-accepted position; settlement prevents estoppel.
Did defendants waive the workers’ compensation exclusivity defense by not pleading it earlier?	Defense was not timely raised and thus waived.	Subject-matter/jurisdictional defenses (like the Act’s exclusivity) are non-waivable and may be raised at any time.	No waiver — exclusivity implicates subject-matter jurisdiction and can be raised late.
Was there a special-employer relationship between CGC (special employer) and Hanisko, barring the tort suit?	No express contract with CGC; the signed offer was not properly authenticated; factual issues (control, hiring/firing, whose work) preclude summary judgment.	The offer letter (and parties’ conduct) show express/implied contract, CGC paid wages, had right to control and daily supervision, and the work was essentially CGC’s — establishing special-employer status.	Held: Hanisko was a special employee of CGC — contract terms plus control, nature of work, and hiring/termination authority support summary judgment for defendants.
Was the residence injury outside the scope of employment (so workers’ comp non-compensable)?	Injury occurred off-duty in bathroom early morning; going/coming/on-call rules raise factual issues.	Employee lived on employer premises as a job benefit and was effectively on-call; injuries in employer-provided residence are often compensable as reasonably incidental to employment.	Held: Injury occurred in employer-provided living quarters and was reasonably incidental to employment; therefore within the scope of employment and subject to exclusivity.

Key Cases Cited

Blessing v. T. Shriver & Co., 94 N.J. Super. 426 (App. Div. 1967) (adopts Larson three-part test for special employer status)
Volb v. G.E. Capital Corp., 139 N.J. 110 (1995) (emphasizes right to control as most important factor in special-employer analysis)
Doe v. St. Michael's Med. Ctr., 184 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1982) (bunkhouse/manager’s quarters rule: residence on employer premises can render injury compensable)
Barbarise v. Overlook Hosp. Ass'n, 88 N.J. Super. 253 (Cnty. Ct. 1965) (mutual-benefit doctrine for employer-provided residence and compensability)
Sabat v. Fedder Corp., 75 N.J. 444 (1978) (going-and-coming and on-call analyses for commuter accidents)
Kimball Intern., Inc. v. Northfield Metal Prods., 334 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 2000) (judicial estoppel is extraordinary and requires court acceptance of earlier position)
Marcysyn v. Hensler, 329 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 2000) (subject-matter defenses may be raised at any time)