Eric Drake v. Seana Willing
03-14-00665-CV
| Tex. App. | Mar 2, 2015Background
- Appellant Eric Drake (pro se) moved to recuse Justices David Puryear and Jeff L. Rose from an appeal arising from a vexatious‑litigant determination, asserting they previously worked for the Texas Attorney General’s Office and therefore may be biased or interested.
- Drake alleges Assistant Attorney General Scot Graydon committed perjury in the trial court and intends to file a federal suit against Graydon (and others, including the Attorney General), increasing the appearance of interest by former A.G. employees on the appellate panel.
- Drake contends that a reasonable person could doubt Puryear’s and Rose’s impartiality because of past employment relationships with the Attorney General’s Office and possible personal or professional ties to Graydon; he also claims prior court postings and statements reveal racial bias against him.
- He requests recusal under Texas constitutional and procedural standards (judge ‘‘may be interested’’; TRCP 18b and related Texas recusal caselaw) and alternatively seeks transfer to another appellate district.
- The filing includes a certification of conference and service; proposed order forms were submitted for each justice (agree/refuse options). The record reflects scheduling of a hearing on the recusal motion but no completed signed recusal order in the provided text.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Justices Puryear and Rose should recuse based on past employment with the Attorney General’s Office (possible interest) | Drake: past A.G. employment creates an appearance of interest in a matter involving an A.G. attorney (Graydon), so recusal required because judge "may be interested." | No specific response in motion; implicit defense: past employment alone does not mandate recusal absent evidence of actual interest or bias. | Not decided in the text; form orders submitted and hearing set. |
| Whether impartiality "might reasonably be questioned" under TRCP 18b(b)(1) | Drake: a reasonable person, knowing the facts and Drake’s allegations, would doubt impartiality. | Implicit counter: mere speculation about relationships and future litigation does not meet recusal standard. | Not decided in the text; motion pending and referral/hearing indicated. |
| Whether alleged personal bias or prejudice requires recusal under TRCP 18b(b)(2) | Drake: prior postings and court conduct reveal racial bias and deep prejudice, undermining impartiality. | Implicit counter: allegations are conclusory and insufficiently substantiated for automatic disqualification. | Not decided in the text. |
| Whether transfer to another appellate district is appropriate | Drake: transfer requested to avoid any appearance of conflicts between former A.G. employees on panel and the A.G. attorney at issue. | Implicit counter: transfer unnecessary unless recusal is granted or statutory grounds satisfied. | Transfer motion filed with recusal motion; disposition not reflected in provided text. |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. Viswanathan, 65 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001) (recusal standard under TRCP 18b discussed)
- Sears v. Olivarez, 28 S.W.3d 611 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000) (standard for reasonable doubt about judge's impartiality)
- Kniatt v. State, 239 S.W.3d 910 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007) (bias need not arise from extrajudicial source to disqualify)
- Metzger v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1994) (due process guarantees an impartial tribunal)
- Woodruff v. Wright, 51 S.W.3d 727 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001) (recusal and due process discussion)
- Cameron v. [unnamed], 582 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1979) (personal interest as disqualifying)
- Sun Oil Co. v. [unnamed], 483 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. 1972) (direct personal interest in result is disqualifying)