Eric Borcik v. Crosby Tugs, L.L.C.
222 So. 3d 672
| La. | 2017Background
- Eric Borcik, a deckhand employed by Crosby Tugs, alleged his captain ordered illegal dumping of waste oil; he complained to Crosby’s CAO and later was transferred and fired.
- Borcik sued under the Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Act (R.S. 30:2027), seeking treble damages and other relief for retaliatory termination.
- R.S. 30:2027 protects an employee "acting in good faith" who "reasonably believes" an employer’s activity violates environmental law — statute does not define "good faith."
- At trial the court instructed the jury combining two proposed definitions: (1) honest belief a violation occurred; and (2) absence of intent to seek unfair advantage or to harm others.
- The jury found Borcik reasonably believed a violation occurred but did not act in "good faith," and returned a defense verdict; the Fifth Circuit certified the meaning of "good faith" to the Louisiana Supreme Court.
- The Louisiana Supreme Court held "good faith" means acting with an honest belief that an environmental law, rule, or regulation was violated (a subjective honesty standard), distinct from the statute’s separate objective "reasonable belief" requirement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of "good faith" in R.S. 30:2027 | "Good faith" = honest belief that a violation occurred (subjective honesty) | "Good faith" requires absence of malice or intent to seek unfair advantage or harm (motivation-based) | "Good faith" means the employee acted with an honest belief that a violation occurred (subjective honesty); separate statutory "reasonable belief" covers objectivity |
| Whether motives (malice/ill will) should bar protection | Mixed motives should not defeat protection if honest belief exists | Motive to harm or gain should exclude protection to shield employers | Motive-based exclusion rejected; motive inquiry would chill reporting and duplicate/contradict statutory objective standard |
| Whether definition should include objective component | Plaintiff: objective component already in statute ("reasonable belief") — so unnecessary in "good faith" | Defendant: include absence-of-malice to prevent abuse | Court retained objective element in statute and limited "good faith" to honesty to avoid redundancy and absurd results |
| Whether broad interpretation undermines safeguards against fabricated claims | Plaintiff: broad definition encourages reporting and aligns with LEQA purpose | Defendant: broad definition could protect bad-faith reporters who intend harm | Court: safeguards remain — statute bars employees who deliberately violate law and requires a "reasonable belief" standard; honest belief plus reasonable belief suffices |
Key Cases Cited
- Cheramie v. J. Wayne Plaisance, Inc., 595 So. 2d 619 (La. 1992) (interpreting LEQA whistleblower provisions broadly to protect environmental reporting)
- Wichita County v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1996) (defines good faith in whistleblower context as honest belief plus reasonable belief given training/experience)
- Overton v. Shell Oil Co., 937 So. 2d 404 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2006) (state appellate decision addressing facts-specific issues regarding good faith)
- State v. Guinn, 319 So. 2d 407 (La. 1975) (discussing objective "reasonable belief" standard)
- Rhineheimer v. U.S. Bancorp Investments, Inc., 787 F.3d 797 (6th Cir. 2015) (discussing subjective and objective components in whistleblower law)
- Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (analyzing objective reasonableness requirement in whistleblower protections)