177 F. Supp. 3d 197
D.D.C.2016Background
- Equitas Disability Advocates (successor to Fulcrum) entered two agreements (SACCA and FAASA) with Feigenbaum and DDB providing access to an "Archive" and fee-sharing; both agreements state they are governed by D.C. law, use JAMS Streamlined Rules, require arbitration in Washington, D.C., and provide that "judgment may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction."
- Equitas demanded arbitration (Dec. 2013). After preliminary proceedings, a final hearing was set for Dec. 8, 2014; Equitas’s counsel (Zuckerman Spaeder) withdrew and Equitas sought a continuance on Nov. 26, 2014. The arbitrator denied the continuance and proceeded; he ruled for defendants and ordered Equitas to reimburse arbitration fees.
- Defendants filed a motion to confirm the award in Massachusetts state court; Equitas filed a motion to vacate in D.C. Superior Court. Defendants removed the D.C. Superior action to federal court on diversity grounds.
- Equitas moved to remand, arguing that the D.C. Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (DCRAA) vests exclusive jurisdiction in D.C. Superior Court because the contracts chose D.C. law and D.C. as the arbitration forum; Equitas also moved to vacate the award for denial of the continuance.
- Defendants argued the FAA governs post-arbitral review (making Equitas’s vacatur motion untimely) and, alternatively, that regardless of statutory regime, the arbitrator’s denial was not an abuse of discretion; they moved to confirm the award in federal court.
- The district court concluded it had diversity jurisdiction, held the contract did not incorporate D.C.’s exclusive-venue rule to bar federal court review, denied remand and vacatur, and granted confirmation of the award.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether action must be remanded because contract-choiced D.C. law incorporates DCRAA §16-4426(b)’s exclusive jurisdiction in D.C. Superior Court | Equitas: choice-of-law + arbitration-in-DC means DCRAA gives D.C. Superior Court exclusive venue for confirmation/vacatur | Defendants: parties’ contract allows review in any court; FAA governs post-arbitral review; no exclusive bar to federal court | Denied remand — court interprets contract so the specific clause ("any court of competent jurisdiction") allows federal diversity jurisdiction; DCRAA not incorporated to create exclusive forum limiting federal jurisdiction |
| Whether FAA preempts DCRAA forum rule or otherwise bars application of local arbitration rules | Equitas: DCRAA applies because parties chose D.C. law and D.C. forum | Defendants: FAA conflicts or governs post-award relief | FAA does not preempt application of state law agreed to by parties; no direct conflict because FAA venue provisions are permissive; here contract language governs forum choice |
| Whether arbitrator’s denial of continuance requires vacatur | Equitas: denial was arbitrary; withdrawal of counsel and lack of time prejudiced presentation of material evidence | Defendants: denial was reasonable given delay, prior notice of counsel withdrawal, scheduling and non-refundable travel, and no showing of foreclosed material evidence | Denied vacatur — arbitrator’s denial not an abuse of discretion; Equitas showed insufficient cause and failed to proffer material evidence it could not present |
| Whether court must confirm award despite forum-shopping allegations | Equitas: request to decline confirmation as sanction for defendants’ forum shopping | Defendants: confirmation required once vacatur denied | Granted confirmation — court must confirm unless vacatur/modify/correct grounds apply; no authority to refuse confirmation for forum-shopping claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Karsner v. Lothian, 532 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (amount-in-controversy/demand approach for arbitration confirmation actions)
- Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Const. Co., 529 U.S. 193 (2000) (FAA venue provisions are permissive; parties may agree on alternative venue)
- Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (FAA does not automatically preempt state rules the parties contractually adopt)
- Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (interpreting choice-of-law clause ambiguity and reconciling state-law incorporation with arbitration clause)
- Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (statutory grounds for vacatur of arbitral awards are exclusive)
- Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (distinguishing jurisdictional limits from nonjurisdictional timing provisions)