Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Rexnord Industries, LLC
966 F. Supp. 2d 829
E.D. Wis.2013Background
- EEOC alleges Rexnord terminated assembler Danielle Sullivan (employed June 30, 2008–May 15, 2009) because it regarded her as disabled (possible seizure disorder) or because of an actual disability (migraines).
- Sullivan experienced two on-site medical incidents (Oct. 16, 2008 and Apr. 22, 2009), was taken by ambulance, and obtained medical work excuses; records and providers variably described her symptoms as "blackouts," possible seizures, or severe migraines.
- Rexnord ordered a fitness-for-duty exam by Dr. Andrew Seter (May 11, 2009); Dr. Seter concluded Sullivan had an active seizure disorder, posed a direct safety risk, and should not return until stabilized; Rexnord terminated Sullivan on May 15, 2009.
- EEOC submitted contrary expert evidence (Dr. George Morris) and treating-physician testimony casting doubt on a definitive seizure diagnosis and supporting migraines as the cause of blackouts; factual disputes exist about loss of consciousness, duration, and control of episodes.
- Rexnord also relies on Sullivan’s SSDI application (she applied claiming epilepsy), her absences from work, and a positive urine test (benzodiazepines and cannabinoids) from Oct. 16, 2008 as possible bases to justify termination or limit damages; timing and application of an after-acquired-evidence defense remain disputed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sullivan was a "qualified individual" under the ADA because she posed a direct threat | EEOC: factual disputes (medical opinions, controlling treatment, nature/duration of blackouts) preclude finding a direct threat | Rexnord: Dr. Seter’s fitness-for-duty opinion + workplace dangers justify direct-threat determination and termination | Denied summary judgment — genuine disputes of material fact about direct threat and reasonableness of reliance on Dr. Seter |
| Whether SSDI application estops or undermines Sullivan’s ADA claim | EEOC: Sullivan applied but was denied SSDI; she explained beliefs at the time and can reconcile statements | Rexnord: SSDI application saying she could not work shows she was not a qualified individual | Denied summary judgment — application was unawarded and explanation suffices for jury consideration under Cleveland framework |
| Whether Sullivan’s absenteeism rendered her unqualified | EEOC: absences were health-related and not so erratic/unexplained as to be per se disqualifying | Rexnord: >22 missed days and attendance is essential; absences justify finding unqualified | Denied summary judgment — record does not show absenteeism intolerable as a matter of law |
| After-acquired-evidence defense based on drug-free workplace policy (positive urine test) | EEOC: disputes over whether Sullivan was actually "under the influence" and when Rexnord learned the records | Rexnord: positive drug test and policy would have led to discharge; discovery of records limits damages | Denied summary judgment — material facts about policy standard and timing of discovery are disputed |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment standard)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment burden-allocation principles)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (U.S. 2002) (direct-threat standard requires reasonable, individualized medical judgment)
- Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (U.S. 1998) (objective reasonableness of medical views in ADA context)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (U.S. 1999) (SSD/SSDI applications and apparent inconsistencies with ADA claims)
- Bekker v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 229 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2000) (ADA discrimination principles)
- EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., 253 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 2001) (attendance/absenteeism and ADA)
- EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 630 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2010) (expert testimony not always required to prove physical impairment)
- Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1999) (after-acquired-evidence limits to back pay under McKennon framework)