Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. EmCare, Inc., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8838

Trahan worked for EmCare’s AnesthesiaCare division (Nov 2008–Aug 7, 2009) and complained repeatedly to HR about CEO McKinney’s persistent sexual remarks and gestures directed at employees.
After a particularly offensive incident on “Bring Your Child to Work Day” (June 2009), Trahan, Shaw, and Thompson made formal complaints to HR; Johnson asked them to file a written complaint.
An audit of Trahan’s unit was conducted in July 2009; the audit report contained some criticisms but was overall not devastating and Trahan received little negative feedback before termination.
On August 7, 2009, EmCare terminated Trahan (and the two coworkers who complained); Richardson testified he made the decision but acknowledged discussing it with Thornton and McKinney; Thornton entered the termination into the company system.
EEOC sued under Title VII for retaliation; after a six-day jury trial the jury found in favor of the EEOC and awarded back pay to Trahan; the district court denied JMOL and a new trial. EmCare appealed only the causation/knowledge issue as to Trahan.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether EEOC presented legally sufficient evidence of causation for Title VII retaliation (i.e., that the decisionmaker knew of Trahan’s protected complaints or was influenced by someone who did)	Trahan: evidence supports inference Richardson knew of complaints (McKinney reacted to complaints; Thornton and Johnson had daily contact; Thornton discussed Trahan with Richardson; timing and audit were suspicious); alternatively Thornton participated in decisionmaking	EmCare: no evidence Richardson was aware of complaints; any inference is speculative; Richardson was sole decisionmaker who testified he lacked knowledge	Affirmed. Sufficient circumstantial evidence supported causation — jury could infer Richardson knew or that Thornton was a decisionmaker/participant, so JMOL was properly denied

EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013) (standard of review for JMOL and deference to jury verdicts)
Zamora v. City of Houston, 798 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2015) (trial-on-the-merits approach permitting bypass of McDonnell Douglas and inquiry into whether jury could find retaliation)
Thomas v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 220 F.3d 389 (5th Cir. 2000) (elements of Title VII retaliation claim)
Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., 332 F.3d 874 (5th Cir. 2003) (employer knowledge of protected activity required for causation)
Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2000) (definition of decisionmaker for causation inquiry)
Lee v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 2009) (limited inference from generalized discussions about employees)
Raney v. Vinson Guard Serv., 120 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 1997) (timing plus speculation insufficient to prove decisionmaker knowledge)
Mulhall v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2002) (circumstantial evidence can establish decisionmaker awareness)
Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446 (7th Cir. 1994) (same: circumstantial proof of decisionmaker knowledge is permissible)
Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155 (11th Cir. 1993) (circumstantial evidence can demonstrate that decisionmaker knew of protected activity)