277 F. Supp. 3d 1000
N.D. Iowa2017Background
- This fee litigation follows protracted Title VII sexual-harassment and retaliation litigation between EEOC and CRST; the district court originally awarded CRST $4.7M in fees (2013) after dismissing many EEOC claims for failures including presuit conciliation and on the merits.
- The Eighth Circuit reversed parts of the fee award (2014), holding (at that time) that presuit-dismissed claims were non-merits and criticizing lack of individualized findings for 78 claimants; it also barred fees tied to a pattern-or-practice theory the EEOC had not pleaded.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that prevailing-party status depends on a "material alteration of the legal relationship" with judicial imprimatur (quoting Buckhannon), not strictly on merits rulings; it remanded unresolved questions (2016).
- On remand the district court considered: (1) whether EEOC waived an argument that only preclusive judgments make a defendant a prevailing party; (2) whether CRST’s dismissal of 67 presuit-claims produced the necessary material alteration; and (3) individualized Christiansburg findings for 78 claimants dismissed on summary judgment.
- The court found EEOC waived the preclusion argument, held that a preclusive judgment is not required (though sufficient), concluded the court’s dismissal of the 67 presuit claims did effect a judicially-sanctioned material alteration (because EEOC must complete presuit duties to refile), and made individualized findings applying Christiansburg and Fox to award reduced fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (EEOC) | Defendant's Argument (CRST) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Waiver of preclusion argument | EEOC: did not waive because it reasonably relied on binding circuit precedent (Marquart) and earlier briefs implicitly raised preclusion | CRST: EEOC failed to preserve explicit preclusion argument before district court and Eighth Circuit; law-of-the-case bars it | Court: EEOC waived; explicit preclusion theory not raised earlier and may be forfeited |
| Is a preclusive judgment required for "prevailing party" status | EEOC: yes — without preclusion plaintiff could refile so no legal relationship altered | CRST: no — material alteration (with judicial imprimatur) is the touchstone; preclusion not necessary | Court: preclusive judgment is sufficient but not necessary; analyze case-by-case under material-alteration standard |
| Did dismissal of 67 presuit claims materially alter legal relationship | EEOC: administrative/factual processes don’t alter legal rights; dismissal left EEOC free to pursue claims | CRST: dismissal altered relationship because EEOC must comply with presuit obligations to refile; dismissal marked by judicial imprimatur | Court: dismissal constituted judicially-sanctioned material alteration (EEOC must perform statutory duties before refiling); CRST is prevailing party as to those claims |
| Individualized Christiansburg/Fox fee findings | EEOC: many summary-judgment losses were not frivolous; Fox prevents awarding fees unless defendant shows fees "but-for" frivolous claims and allocation is feasible | CRST: specific claims lacked basis (time-barred, no notice, remediated, not severe/pervasive, reliance on unpled pattern claim); aggregate allocation (per-claim average) appropriate here | Court: made individualized findings — most of the 78 claims (and portions of some) were frivolous/unreasonable for reasons listed; applied Fox pragmatically and awarded $1,860,127.36 in fees (denying appellate fees and limiting pattern-or-practice fees) |
Key Cases Cited
- CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 136 S. Ct. 1642 (2016) (Supreme Court clarifies prevailing-party test: judicially sanctioned material alteration of legal relationship is the touchstone)
- Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (judicial imprimatur required for prevailing-party status)
- Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412 (1978) (standard for awarding fees to prevailing Title VII defendants: action frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation)
- Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826 (2011) (when plaintiff asserts frivolous and nonfrivolous claims, fees awarded only for costs defendant would not have incurred but for frivolous claims; but court should do "rough justice")
- E.E.O.C. v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 774 F.3d 1169 (8th Cir. 2014) (reversing parts of district court’s fee award; required individualized findings and barred fees tied to unpled pattern-or-practice theory)
- E.E.O.C. v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2012) (merits appeal; discussed scope of claims and pattern-or-practice pleading)
- United States v. $32,820.56, 838 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 2016) (voluntary dismissal without prejudice did not confer prevailing-party status because no material alteration)
- East Iowa Plastics, Inc. v. PI, Inc., 832 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2016) (no fee award where result restored status quo and both sides obtained favorable relief)
- Wood v. Burwell, 837 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2016) (procedural remedies can effect a material alteration of legal relationship even if substantive outcome later unchanged)
- Marquart v. Lodge 837, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 26 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 1994) (pre-existing Eighth Circuit precedent describing prevailing-party inquiry as requiring a merits ruling)