Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Dolgencorp, LLC
196 F. Supp. 3d 783
E.D. Tenn.2016Background
- Atkins, an insulin-dependent diabetic employed by Dollar General (2009–2012), informed her store manager she needed quick access to juice/snacks at the register to prevent hypoglycemic episodes.
- Company policy prohibited food/drink at the register (anti‑grazing policy); employees were trained not to leave the front of the store unsecured and to ring up purchases through management.
- Atkins, while working alone on two occasions, drank store juice to avert hypoglycemia, later paying for the items; she reported both incidents to her manager, Wanda Shown.
- During a March 15, 2012 shrinkage audit, two coworkers admitted grazing and were terminated; Atkins admitted grazing due to a medical emergency and was terminated the same day before HR could consider an accommodation.
- Atkins filed an EEOC charge (dual‑filed with THRC) within 300 days; EEOC sued and Atkins intervened asserting ADA claims for failure to accommodate, discriminatory discharge, and retaliation.
- Court resolved discovery disputes (declining to strike two declarations; permitting late deposition) and decided motions for summary judgment: denied summary judgment on accommodation and discharge claims, granted summary judgment dismissing Atkins’s retaliation claim as not administratively exhausted, and found claims timely under the 300‑day rule.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness (180 v. 300 days) | Atkins dual‑filed with THRC so 300‑day limit applies | THRC lacks jurisdiction over failure‑to‑accommodate theory so 180‑day limit applies | 300‑day limit applies; claims timely (THRC had jurisdiction over defendant) |
| Administrative exhaustion of retaliation claim | Retaliation grew from facts in EEOC charge | Atkins did not allege retaliation in EEOC charge so claim unexhausted | Retaliation claim dismissed for failure to administratively exhaust (charge did not clearly allege retaliation) |
| Failure to accommodate (prima facie & interactive process) | Atkins requested accommodation verbally to supervisor; employer knew disability; employer failed to engage in interactive process | Request not properly made/formal; alternative accommodations (break room, apron, front cooler) were available | Genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether a reasonable accommodation was requested/provided and whether interactive process occurred; summary judgment denied to both parties |
| Discriminatory discharge (direct v. indirect evidence and pretext) | Termination was result of disability‑related conduct or employer’s failure to accommodate; similarly situated non‑disabled employees were treated better | Termination for legitimate nondiscriminatory reason: grazing policy violation; coworkers likewise terminated | Court finds insufficient direct‑evidence showing; under indirect proof a triable issue remains on prima facie and pretext (summary judgment denied to both parties) |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burden and standards)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment and genuine‑issue standard)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., 485 F.3d 862 (failure‑to‑accommodate and direct‑evidence discussion)
- Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312 (ADA "but‑for" causation rule for discriminatory discharge)