Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, 876 F.3d 1273

Background

Chastity Jones, a Black woman, received a job offer from Catastrophe Management Solutions (CMS) but CMS rescinded the offer after learning she wore dreadlocks; HR told her dreadlocks “tend to get messy.”
CMS had a written, race-neutral grooming policy banning “excessive hairstyles,” but no written rule specifically naming dreadlocks.
The EEOC sued on Jones’s behalf under Title VII, alleging that banning dreadlocks constitutes race discrimination because dreadlocks are culturally and physiologically associated with people of African descent and reflect racial stereotyping.
The district court dismissed the complaint; an Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed, relying on precedent that Title VII protects immutable characteristics (Willingham/Garcia) and concluding the complaint failed to allege dreadlocks are immutable.
The court declined rehearing en banc; Judge Jordan (concurring in denial) agreed with the panel, emphasizing immutability and that a neutral grooming rule does not, by itself, show intentional race discrimination; Judge Martin (dissenting from denial) argued Price Waterhouse’s stereotyping doctrine forecloses an immutability requirement and that the complaint plausibly alleged race-based disparate treatment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a ban on dreadlocks can state a Title VII disparate-treatment race claim	Jones/EEOC: dreadlocks are a racialized trait (physiologically and culturally tied to Black people) and CMS relied on racial stereotype, so rescinding the offer is intentional race discrimination	CMS: grooming rule is race-neutral and applies to all employees; dreadlocks are a mutable hairstyle, not an immutable racial characteristic, so no disparate-treatment claim	Panel/Affirmance: complaint failed to allege dreadlocks are an immutable characteristic of Black persons and did not plausibly show race-based intent; rehearing en banc denied (majority)
Whether Willingham’s immutable-trait requirement governs disparate-treatment claims	EEOC: Price Waterhouse’s stereotyping doctrine allows Title VII claims based on mutable traits tied to protected categories; immutability is not required	CMS: courts have followed Willingham/Garcia requiring immutability for protected characteristics beyond statutory categories	Panel: applied Willingham/Garcia immutability test and required immutable trait allegation; concurrence agreed; dissent argued Price Waterhouse supersedes Willingham and immutability is not required
Whether the complaint plausibly alleged pretext or that CMS actually relied on race-linked stereotyping	EEOC: complaint alleges CMS’s stated reason (“they tend to get messy”) did not apply to Jones and came from the decisionmaker, supporting inference of reliance on racial stereotype	CMS: polic(ies) applied equally and no direct evidence ties the grooming rule to race; allegation that dreadlocks are more common among Black people is insufficient for disparate-treatment claim	Panel: found allegations insufficient for an inference of race-based intent under existing immutability precedent; dissent saw factual allegations (decisionmaker’s remark and concession) as plausibly showing reliance on stereotype

Key Cases Cited

Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2016) (panel opinion affirming dismissal; rehearing en banc denied)
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (U.S. 1989) (stereotyping can be evidence of sex-based disparate treatment even when trait is mutable)
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (immutable-trait requirement applied to grooming/sex-differentiated policies)
Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing immutability in national-origin context)
Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding denial of promotion for wearing an Afro stated a race claim)
Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (interpreting Price Waterhouse as allowing stereotyping evidence in mixed-motive claims)
Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011) (recognizing gender-nonconformity as sex discrimination under Price Waterhouse)