Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Simbaki, Ltd.
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17881
| 5th Cir. | 2014Background
- Kulig and Baatz sued Berryhill Hot Tamales Corp. for Title VII harassment at Berryhill Montrose (a Berryhill franchise).
- District court dismissed claims against Corporate for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for relying on a per se rule that represented parties cannot invoke exceptions.
- EEOC charges named Berryhill Montrose, not Berryhill Corporate, and used the Berryhill trade name; charges listed Montrose address and Wattel as owner.
- Berryhill Corporate argued Wattel’s operation was separate from Corporate and that charges could not proceed against Corporate absent naming.
- EEOC proceedings showed limited involvement by Berryhill Corporate, though EEOC records and internal communications suggested Corporate notice and potential liability.
- Court remanded after finding that represented parties may invoke the judicially-recognized exceptions to the named-party requirement, vacating the district court’s summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May represented plaintiffs invoke exceptions to the named-party requirement | Kulig | Berryhill | Yes; represented parties may invoke the exceptions. |
| Whether EEOC charges named Berryhill Corporate | Kulig and Baatz did not name Corporate | Corporate | No; charges did not name Corporate. |
| Authority for exceptions to named-party requirement (Glus/Eggleston) applicability to represented parties | Kulig and Baatz should be able to rely on exceptions | Only pro se parties may rely on exceptions (defense) | Represented parties may invoke the exceptions; not limited to pro se. |
| District court’s summary judgment on exhaustion grounds | Exhaustion could be shown via exceptions | No exhaustion since Corporate not named | Vacated; remand for district court to decide under Glus or Eggleston. |
| Remand scope | Court should address exposure under single/joint employer theories | Remand unnecessary if exhaustion fails | Remand to determine eligibility under Glus/Eggleston; no view on merits. |
Key Cases Cited
- Way v. Mueller Brass Co., 840 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1988) (naming requirement liberal construction; precludes unnamed defendant unless exceptions apply)
- Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1978) (identity-of-interest test for unnamed party equally liable)
- Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers’ Local Union No. 130, U.A., 657 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1981) (actual notice and opportunity to conciliate under named-party rule)
- Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389 (2008) (post-charge notices cannot redefine a charge; must examine the charge itself)
- Viswanathan v. Leland Stanford Junior University, 1 F. App’x 669 (9th Cir. 2001) (named-party rule exceptions based on predictability)
- Romero v. U. Pac. R.R., 615 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1980) (application of identity-of-interest/Glus approach to exceptions)
- Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc., 189 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 1999) (single employer theory among exceptions to named-party rule)
- Romain v. Kurek, 836 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1987) ( Seventh Circuit-like approach adopted by multiple circuits)
- Johnson v. Palma, 931 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1991) (Adopts permissive approach for exceptions to named-party rule)