Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.
884 F.3d 560
| 6th Cir. | 2018Background
- Aimee Stephens, a transgender woman assigned male at birth, worked as a funeral director for R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes until she informed owner Thomas Rost she intended to present and dress as a woman; Rost then fired her.
- EEOC investigated and found reasonable cause that Stephens was discharged because of sex/gender identity and that the Funeral Home provided suits to male public-facing employees but gave no comparable clothing benefit to female employees.
- EEOC sued under Title VII for (1) unlawful termination based on sex (sex‑stereotyping and transgender/transitioning status) and (2) discriminatory clothing-allowance policy.
- The district court found direct evidence of sex discrimination but granted summary judgment for the Funeral Home, holding RFRA barred enforcement of Title VII and that EEOC’s clothing-allowance claim fell outside the scope of the administrative charge.
- The Sixth Circuit reversed: it held Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sex‑stereotyping and transgender/transitioning status, rejected the ministerial-exception defense, concluded RFRA does not shield the employer (and, alternatively, that enforcement satisfies strict scrutiny), and held the clothing-allowance claim could reasonably grow out of the EEOC investigation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether firing Stephens violated Title VII as sex stereotyping / transgender discrimination | EEOC/Stephens: termination for wanting to present as a woman is sex discrimination under Price Waterhouse and Smith; transgender/transitioning status is covered because it is inherently gender nonconforming | Funeral Home: dress code equally burdens both sexes; Title VII does not protect transgender status (sex is strictly biological) | Court: Title VII forbids sex stereotyping and covers transgender/transitioning status; summary judgment for EEOC on unlawful-termination claim granted |
| Whether RFRA prevents enforcement of Title VII here because it would substantially burden Rost’s religious exercise | Funeral Home: requiring Stephens be allowed to present as female would violate Rost’s sincere religious beliefs and substantially burden his ministry/business | EEOC: accommodating sympathetic customers’ biases or employer’s subjective sense of endorsement is not a substantial burden; mere compliance does not equal endorsement | Court: RFRA defense fails—continuing to employ Stephens does not substantially burden Rost as a matter of law |
| If RFRA burden existed, whether applying Title VII is the least restrictive means to further a compelling government interest | EEOC: government has a compelling interest in eradicating workplace sex discrimination and enforcing Title VII is the least restrictive and uniform means | Funeral Home: less restrictive alternatives exist (gender‑neutral dress code, other accommodations) | Court: EEOC’s interest is compelling and Title VII enforcement is the least restrictive means; district court erred in suggesting a dress‑code accommodation would suffice |
| Whether EEOC may pursue a clothing-allowance claim not explicitly in Stephens’s charge (scope of EEOC complaint) | EEOC: investigating Stephens’s termination reasonably would lead to inquiry into dress/benefits disparities; the clothing claim reasonably grew from the charge | Funeral Home: Sixth Circuit precedent limits EEOC to claims reasonably expected from the original charge; clothing-allowance claim was outside that scope | Court: clothing-allowance claim reasonably could grow out of the investigation into Stephens’s termination; reverse and remand for merits consideration |
Key Cases Cited
- Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sex‑stereotyping)
- Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (sex‑stereotyping claim by transgender person cognizable under Title VII)
- Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (RFRA framework: substantial burden then strict scrutiny)
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (RFRA strict‑scrutiny standard and least‑restrictive‑means analysis)
- Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) (what constitutes a substantial burden under RFRA)
- Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (ministerial‑exception doctrine)
- General Telephone Co. of the Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980) (scope of EEOC enforcement actions; Rule 23 discussion)
- Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005) (transgender plaintiff’s non‑conforming appearance outside work can inform Title VII claim)
- Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (grooming standards and Title VII; contrasted and distinguished)
- EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1977) (limits on EEOC suit scope tied to investigation reasonably expected to grow out of charge)
- Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008) (recognizing Title VII protection for transgender status)