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711 S.E.2d 912
S.C.
2011
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Background

  • Epstein purchased land in Horry County in 2004, deed recorded in 2004, near 120 acres and a large building.
  • In 2006 Epstein financed Ascott Valley Development with two mortgages totaling $3.3 million, securing 45 acres and 70+ acres.
  • Ascott conveyed to Coastal Timber a Timber Title in June 2006 for $115,000, authorizing removal of merchantable timber within 12 months; Coastal paid and removed timber.
  • Ascott defaulted on Epstein’s mortgage; Epstein learned timber had been removed during foreclosure proceedings against Ascott.
  • Epstein sued Coastal in 2009 seeking damages for timber removed, arguing his recorded mortgages secured the timber and were superior to Coastal’s Timber Title.
  • The circuit court granted summary judgment to Coastal, holding UCC provisions convert standing timber to goods and extinguish Epstein’s lien unless perfected under the UCC; Epstein appealed.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether the UCC converts standing timber to goods and defeats preexisting liens Epstein argues timber remained encumbered by his mortgage as real property. Coastal argues timber to be cut is goods under UCC and must be secured under UCC perfection rules. No; UCC did not cancel preexisting liens; standing timber remains subject to prior real property liens.
Whether Epstein’s mortgages secured the timber despite UCC requirements Mortgages on real property included timber unless expressly excluded. UCC security interests in timber to be cut require a financing statement or mortgage specifying the timber and land. Epstein’s mortgage secured the timber; UCC perfection not required to defeat Coastal’s claim.
Priority between preexisting liens and later contracts for timber to be cut Preexisting lien remains superior to later timber sale contracts. Timber-to-be-cut contracts can create separate security interests that may be superior if properly perfected. Preexisting liens remain senior to later UCC-type interests; rights are harmonized, not cancelled.

Key Cases Cited

  • First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank of Columbia v. N.Y. Title & Mortgage Co., 172 S.C. 446 (1934) (timber as realty unless severed; timber conveys with land)
  • D.W. Alderman & Sons Co. v. Kirven, 209 S.C. 446 (1946) (trees growing on land are part of realty until severed)
  • Simms v. Kearse, 42 S.C. 43 (1894) (mortgagee lien on mortgaged land secures timber as part of land)
  • Feliciana Bank & Trust v. Manuel & Sessions, L.L.C., 943 So. 2d 736 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (bank's deed of trust secures timber; perfection under UCC not required for preexisting liens)
  • Manios v. Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P., 389 S.C. 126 (Ct. App. 2010) (deed of trust is security interest; discussion cited in context)
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Case Details

Case Name: Epstein v. Coastal Timber Co., Inc.
Court Name: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Date Published: Jul 11, 2011
Citations: 711 S.E.2d 912; 2011 S.C. LEXIS 222; 393 S.C. 276; 75 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 85; 26997
Docket Number: 26997
Court Abbreviation: S.C.
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