Epicurean Developments LLC v. Summit Township, 334355

Background

Epicurean bought a commercial building and The Club leased it to operate a "private membership club." Building permit/site-plan filings described a private membership club and renovations; defendant (Summit Township) later required an administrative site plan and raised zoning concerns.
Township Zoning Administrator issued a stop-work order after discovering plaintiffs’ website and materials suggesting nightclub/dance-club amenities and links to swingers-network identifiers; Township concluded the proposed use was not a permitted C-2 "club or lodge."
Plaintiffs sued in circuit court challenging the stop-work order; the trial court dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies (appeal to the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA)).
Plaintiffs then appealed and also filed an appeal/interpretation request to the ZBA; the ZBA (6–1) found the use did not fit the STZO’s "clubs and lodges" category (characterizing the proposal as a nightclub/swingers club). The circuit court affirmed and this Court consolidated appeals and affirmed.
Court held: "clubs and lodges" ambiguous and must be read in context; given the ordinance text, history, and record evidence, the proposed nightclub-style use was not the kind of "club or lodge" permitted in C-2; plaintiffs’ due process and First Amendment challenges failed; the separate appeal of the original dismissal was moot after the administrative appeal.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Proper meaning of "clubs and lodges" in STZO	Plaintiffs: "club" includes their private membership club; plain dictionary meaning covers their use	Township: "clubs and lodges" means civic/social/organizational meeting places, not nightclubs; read in ordinance context and history	Court: Term ambiguous; interpret in context with "lodge" and ordinance structure; plaintiffs’ proposed nightclub/dance-club use is not a permitted "club or lodge" in C-2
Use of extrinsic evidence by ZBA	Plaintiffs: ZBA should interpret ordinance text only; extrinsic evidence improperly considered	Township: ZBA may consider evidence to determine actual proposed use; ordinance contemplates record transmission	Held: ZBA properly considered documentary evidence to determine the actual use; ordinance procedure permits this
Procedural and substantive due process	Plaintiffs: ZBA biased, deprived of fair hearing; interpretation arbitrary and capricious	Township: Plaintiffs had notice, opportunity to be heard, evidence supported ZBA factual findings and reasonable interpretation	Held: No procedural due process violation (adequate notice/hearing/impartial tribunal); no substantive due process violation—ZBA’s action not arbitrary or conscience-shocking
First Amendment/content-based restriction	Plaintiffs: ZBA/ordinance impermissibly targeted expressive conduct or content	Township: ZBA decision concerned land-use characteristics, not speech; plaintiffs did not identify protected expressive conduct	Held: No First Amendment violation; regulation/decision was not a content-based restriction on expressive conduct

Key Cases Cited

Great Lakes Soc v Georgetown Charter Twp, 281 Mich. App. 396 (interpretation of zoning ordinance; deference to ZBA on facts, de novo on law)
Edw C Levy Co v Marine City Zoning Bd of Appeals, 293 Mich. App. 333 (review standard giving deference to ZBA factual findings)
Macenas v Village of Michiana, 433 Mich. 380 (zoning fact-finding entitled to deference; distinction between factual findings and legal application)
Norman Corp v City of East Tawas, 263 Mich. App. 194 (plain-meaning rule for ordinance interpretation)
Bonner v City of Brighton, 495 Mich. 209 (property-use interests and due process principles)
Mettler Walloon, LLC v Melrose Twp, 281 Mich. App. 184 (substantive due process standard for municipal actions)
Reed v Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155 (content-based speech regulation and strict scrutiny)