Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis
138 S. Ct. 1612
SCOTUS2018Background
- Employees at Epic, Ernst & Young, and Murphy Oil signed arbitration agreements requiring individualized (one-on-one) arbitration and waiving class/collective procedures; employees sued under the FLSA and state-law analogues seeking collective/class relief.
- Employers moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); some courts compelled arbitration, while others (and the NLRB in D.R. Horton) held the waivers unlawful under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
- The key statutory tension: FAA's directive to enforce arbitration agreements as written (9 U.S.C. §§2–4, including the §2 “saving clause”) versus NLRA §7’s protection of employees’ “concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection.”
- The NLRB (2012) concluded employer-imposed class/collective-action waivers unlawfully interfere with §7 rights; several circuits deferred to or followed that view, creating a circuit split.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the FAA requires enforcement of individualized-arbitration clauses notwithstanding NLRA §7 and the NLRB’s position.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the FAA’s §2 "saving clause" permits invalidating arbitration agreements that bar class/collective procedures | Lewis/Morris: §2 saves defenses (including statutory illegality under NLRA) so class/collective waivers are unenforceable | Epic/Ernst & Young: §2 preserves only generally applicable defenses (fraud, duress, unconscionability); defenses that target arbitration’s fundamental attributes (e.g., banning individualized arbitration) are barred | FAA §2 does not save defenses that single out arbitration or undermine arbitration’s fundamental attributes; class/collective-waiver defense fails under Concepcion reasoning; arbitration agreements enforceable as written |
| Whether NLRA §7 ("concerted activities") displaces or renders unlawful FAA-governed arbitration agreements that bar class/collective actions | Plaintiffs: §7 protects collective legal action as a form of concerted activity and thus §7 manifests a clear congressional intent to override FAA enforcement of class waivers | Employers: §7 focuses on union organization/collective bargaining and does not address judicial/arbitral procedural rules or override the FAA; implied repeal disfavored | No clear and manifest congressional intent in §7 to displace the FAA; courts must harmonize statutes; NLRA does not render class/collective waivers unlawful |
| Whether Chevron deference requires courts to follow NLRB’s contrary interpretation | Plaintiffs/NLRB: courts should defer to the NLRB’s interpretation that §7 forbids class/collective waivers | Employers/majority: Chevron inapplicable because the Board is interpreting NLRA in a way that alters the scope of the FAA (a statute it does not administer); Executive Branch lacks a single position here | Chevron deference not warranted; courts must resolve the statutory tension using traditional tools of construction |
Key Cases Cited
- AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (holding the FAA’s saving clause does not permit state-law rules that disfavor arbitration’s fundamental attributes, such as mandating classwide arbitration)
- Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (arbitration agreements can require individual arbitration of statutory employment claims)
- American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (refusing to find FAA conflict with Sherman Act where class relief was unavailable in arbitration)
- Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (describing the FAA’s liberal federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements)
- Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (FAA applies and arbitration agreements are generally enforceable, subject to §2 defenses)
- Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) (arbitration procedures, including class arbitration, depend on party agreement and arbitrators cannot infer class procedures absent clear contractual basis)
- Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (construing the FAA’s employment-contract exemption narrowly)
- Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (reconciling labor statutes and arbitration/enforcement in the context of collective-bargaining agreements)
