Epic Games, Inc. v. Google LLC, 3:20-cv-05671

Background

Epic Games released Fortnite on Android and iOS; after Epic added code to bypass platform in‑app billing fees ("Project Liberty"), Apple and Google removed Fortnite from their stores and Epic sued each company.
Epic sued Google for monopolization and unlawful tying in two relevant product markets: Android app distribution and Android in‑app billing (geographic market: worldwide excluding China).
Trial evidence showed Google used default settings, multiple "scare screens," OEM agreements (MADA), revenue‑sharing ("Project Hug" and "Project Banyan"), and other deals to entrench Play Store network effects and limit competing app stores and alternative billing.
A jury found Google liable under federal and California antitrust laws; the district court conducted post‑trial remedy proceedings and entered a three‑year permanent injunction ordering among other things: (1) prohibition on certain anti‑competitive agreements; (2) catalog access (third‑party stores can access Play Store app catalog); (3) app‑store distribution (Play Store must allow distribution of third‑party app stores); (4) developers may present alternative billing information; and (5) creation of a three‑person Technical Committee with an eight‑month implementation period for some provisions.
Google appealed, arguing (inter alia) issue preclusion from Epic v. Apple, error in denying bifurcation and in several jury instructions, improper duty‑to‑deal in the remedy, insufficient causal findings, Rule 65 vagueness, and lack of Epic standing to seek nationwide relief.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Epic v. Apple precludes Epic from defining Android‑specific markets here	Epic: Apple involved different commercial realities and theories of harm; markets are case‑specific	Google: prior Apple ruling on digital mobile gaming transactions should preclude a different market here	Rejected — issue preclusion not met; market definition is fact‑specific and submarkets may differ; Apple and Google contexts differ materially
Whether district court abused discretion by denying bifurcation and holding a single jury trial	Epic: factual overlap and intertwinement; parties previously consented to jury trial; prejudice if late change	Google: demanded bench trial on equitable claims and bifurcation; withdrew jury consent	Affirmed — no abuse of discretion; counterclaims and antitrust claims were factually intertwined; Rule 38 jury demand binds unless parties consent
Whether jury should have been instructed on single‑brand aftermarket or permitted to consider cross‑market procompetitive benefits under Rule of Reason	Epic: case does not involve single‑brand aftermarkets; relevant market limited to Android; procompetitive benefits may be considered within instructions given	Google: requested single‑brand aftermarket instruction and broader Rule‑of‑Reason instruction to allow cross‑market benefits (e.g., competition with Apple)	Affirmed — single‑brand aftermarket instruction not warranted (Android market has multiple OEMs/alternatives); exclusion of cross‑market procompetitive benefits was not settled error and any error was harmless
Whether injunction (catalog access; app‑store distribution; prohibitions on certain deals) is lawful, sufficiently specific, and within district court power; standing to seek nationwide relief	Epic: injunction tailored to remedy anticompetitive conduct and network‑effect harms; Technical Committee and reasonable‑fee provisions protect security	Google: remedy unlawfully imposes duty to deal/design products, lacks causation, is vague under Rule 65, may harm IP/security, and nationwide scope exceeds remediable injury	Affirmed — injunction is within equitable power under Section 16; court made adequate causation findings linking conduct to network effects; remedy is a reasonable method to dismantle unlawful advantages; Rule 65 specificity satisfied; Technical Committee and reasonable‑fee safeguards allowed; Epic has standing for nationwide relief

Key Cases Cited

Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 67 F.4th 946 (9th Cir. 2023) (prior Epic v. Apple decision addressing market definition and injunctive relief on anti‑steering)
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (U.S. 1992) (market definition requires inquiry into commercial realities; single‑brand aftermarket discussion)
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (U.S. 2004) (limits of liability for unilateral refusal to deal under Section 2)
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (U.S. 1962) (right to jury trial for legal claims and intertwinement of factual issues)
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (U.S. 1959) (order of jury and equity trials; Seventh Amendment principles)
Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (U.S. 1972) (broad equitable powers to fashion antitrust remedies to restore competition)
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (U.S. 1969) (purpose and scope of private antitrust injunctive relief)
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (U.S. 1962) (recognition of submarkets within broader product markets)
Optronic Techs., Inc. v. Ningbo Sunny Elec. Co., 20 F.4th 466 (9th Cir. 2021) (upholding broad Section 16 injunctive relief to remedy monopolistic conduct)
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (remedial standards and causation for structural and conduct remedies)
Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) (remedial pricing considerations in injunctive relief)
Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (U.S. 2018) (two‑sided market/network effects analysis)